

Supplemental Appendix

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Appendix A: Selection into Intense Enforcement

Table A.1: Girondist Departments and Intense Enforcement

	<i>Lax Enforcement</i>	<i>Intense Enforcement</i>	TOTAL
<i>Not Girondist</i>	11	7	18
<i>Girondist</i>	16	10	26
TOTAL	27	17	44

Note: $\chi^2=0.0008$ which is not statistically significant. The table above illustrates the relationship between intense enforcement of the Republican Calendar and Girondist Departments. About 40% of both lax and intense enforcing departments were not Girondist, and about 60% of intense and lax enforcers were Girondists.

Table A.2: Montagnard Departments and Intense Enforcement

	<i>Lax Enforcement</i>	<i>Intense Enforcement</i>	TOTAL
<i>Not Montagnard</i>	19	12	21
<i>Montagnard</i>	8	5	13
TOTAL	27	17	44

Note: $\chi^2=0.0002$ which is not statistically significant. The table above illustrates the relationship between intense enforcement of the Republican Calendar and Montagnard Departments. About 70% of both lax and intense enforcing departments were not Montagnard, and about 30% of intense and lax enforcers were Montagnard.

Table A.3: Bureaucratic Capacity and Intense Enforcement

	<i>Lax Enforcement</i>	<i>Intense Enforcement</i>	TOTAL
<i>No Candidate</i> (High Capacity)	20	13	33
<i>Candidate</i> (Low Capacity)	7	4	11
TOTAL	27	17	44

Note: $\chi^2=0.0320$ which is not statistically significant. The table above illustrates the relationship between intense enforcement of the Republican Calendar and Girondist Departments. About 75% of both lax and intense enforcing departments did not have a prefecture selected from a slate of candidates (were high capacity), and about 25% of intense and lax enforcers had a prefecture selected from a slate of candidates (were weak capacity).

Table A.4: Missions and Intense Enforcement

	<i>Lax Enforcement</i>	<i>Intense Enforcement</i>	TOTAL
<i>Missions (Low)</i>	8	2	10
<i>Missions (High)</i>	19	15	34
TOTAL	27	17	44

Note: $\chi^2=1.8958$ which is not statistically significant. The table above illustrates the relationship between intense enforcement of the Republican Calendar and a high number of representatives en mission. Although most intense enforcers had a high number of representatives en missions, most places with high levels of representatives en mission were lax enforcers (56% vs. 44%).

Table A.5: Selecting into Strong Enforcement

	(1) Intense Enforcement
Pre-R.C. Conflicts	0.007 (0.011)
Distance from Paris	0.072 (0.777)
City Pop - Department	0.009** (0.004)
Pre-Industrial Activities	-1.076* (0.571)
Nobles 1750	0.118* (0.067)
Share Refractory Clergy	0.553 (1.628)
Girondist	0.426 (1.126)
Montagnard	0.953 (1.293)
Missions	1.828 (1.754)
Candidate City	-0.720 (0.992)
Constant	-4.599 (5.184)
Observations	44

Note: The dependent variable is the strong enforcement of the Republican Calendar. Logistic regression coefficients are reported in models. Positive coefficients indicate an association with strong Republican Calendar enforcement. Standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses. + $p < 0.15$ * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Appendix B: Testing Assumptions

Table B.1: Predicting Labor Conflict Onset Before 1793

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intense Enforcement (1.5 weeks)	-0.535 (0.595)	-0.194 (0.384)		
Intense Enforcement (Top 25%)			0.048 (0.456)	0.053 (0.408)
Time Trend	0.016 (0.017)	0.017 (0.016)	0.019 (0.017)	0.017 (0.016)
Non-Labor Conflicts	0.041* (0.021)	0.034* (0.018)	0.030* (0.017)	0.033* (0.019)
Constant	-2.406*** (0.282)	-2.367*** (0.268)	-2.508*** (0.266)	-2.453*** (0.264)
Observations	1012	1012	1012	1012
Department Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X
Weights	X		X	

The dependent variable is the onset of a labor conflict before 1793. Logistic regression coefficients are reported in models. Positive coefficients for implementation indicate that if the enforcement of the Republican Calendar was more intense, the probability of a labor conflict was higher. Standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses.
+ $p < 0.15$ * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table B.2: Predicting Labor Conflict Onset, Accounting for Department-Level Time Trends

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intense Enforcement (1.5 weeks) \times Post-R.C.	3.764* (1.962)	3.337+ (2.094)		
Intense Enforcement (Top 25%) \times Post-R.C.			2.681 (2.125)	3.778* (2.073)
Post-R.C.	-5.758*** (1.442)	-5.056*** (1.255)	-5.864*** (1.441)	-5.186*** (1.251)
Time Trend	0.041** (0.019)	0.037+ (0.023)	0.057*** (0.022)	0.033+ (0.022)
Non-Labor Conflicts	0.033+ (0.020)	0.029+ (0.020)	0.019 (0.018)	0.030+ (0.020)
Constant	-3.878*** (0.041)	-3.869*** (0.029)	-3.935*** (0.136)	-3.869*** (0.023)
Observations	3311	3311	3311	3311
Department Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X
Department FE \times Trend	X	X	X	X
Weights	X		X	

The dependent variable is the onset of a labor conflict. Logistic regression coefficients are reported in models. Positive coefficients for enforcement indicate that if the enforcement of the Republican Calendar was more intense, the probability of a labor conflict was higher. Standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses. + $p < 0.15$ * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table B.3: Anticipation Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intense (1.5 Weeks) \times Post-Rev., Pre-R.C.	1.675 (1.359)	1.525 (1.265)		
Intense (Top 25%) \times Post-Rev., Pre-R.C.			2.105+ (1.350)	1.730 (1.295)
Post-Rev., Pre-R.C.	-2.310** (0.921)	-2.512*** (0.874)	-1.842** (0.890)	-2.564*** (0.866)
Time Trend	0.061** (0.028)	0.068*** (0.025)	0.043+ (0.029)	0.068*** (0.025)
Non-Labor Conflicts	0.015 (0.016)	0.013 (0.016)	0.013 (0.015)	0.013 (0.016)
Observations	897	897	897	897
Department Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X
Weights	X		X	

The dependent variable is the onset of a labor conflict before 1793. Logistic regression coefficients are reported in models. Positive coefficients for enforcement indicate that if the enforcement of the Republican Calendar was more intense, the probability of a labor conflict was higher. Standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses. + $p < 0.15$ * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Appendix C: Selection Placebos and Alternative Mechanisms

Table C.1: Predicting Labor Conflict Onset, Placebo for Candidate City

	(1)	(2)
Candidate CL \times Post-R.C.	-0.080 (0.889)	-0.858 (0.822)
Post-R.C.	-3.474*** (0.889)	-2.887*** (0.862)
Time Trend	0.019** (0.010)	0.010 (0.008)
Non-Labor Conflicts	0.012 (0.016)	0.031* (0.017)
Observations	3465	3465
Department Fixed Effects	X	X
Weights	X	

The dependent variable is the onset of a labor conflict. Logistic regression coefficients are reported in models. Positive coefficients for the number of registers indicate that if a department's chef lieu was a candidate city, the higher the probability of a labor conflict. Standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses. + $p < 0.15$ * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table C.2: Predicting Labor Conflict Onset, Placebo for Missions

	(1)	(2)
Missions \times Post-R.C.	-1.241 (0.868)	-1.397 (1.111)
Post-R.C.	-2.799*** (1.007)	-2.173* (1.270)
Time Trend	0.018* (0.010)	0.010 (0.008)
Non-Labor Conflicts	0.037** (0.019)	0.033* (0.017)
Observations	3465	3465
Department Fixed Effects	X	X
Weights	X	

The dependent variable is the onset of a labor conflict. Logistic regression coefficients are reported in models. Positive coefficients for missions indicate that if a department had more representatives en mission, the higher the probability of a labor conflict. Standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses. + $p < 0.15$ * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table C.3: Predicting Labor Conflict Onset, Placebo for Social Ties

	(1)	(2)
Social Ties \times Post-R.C.	0.310 (0.829)	-0.106 (0.902)
Post-R.C.	-3.494*** (0.750)	-2.911*** (0.636)
Time Trend	0.011 (0.009)	0.010 (0.008)
Non-Labor Conflicts	0.042* (0.022)	0.031* (0.016)
Observations	3465	3465
Department Fixed Effects	X	X
Weights	X	

The dependent variable is the onset of a labor conflict. Logistic regression coefficients are reported in models. Positive coefficients for the number of registers indicate that if a department had more soldiers and stronger social ties, the higher the probability of a labor conflict. Standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses. + $p < 0.15$ * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table C.4: Predicting Labor Conflict Onset, Placebo for Dechristianization

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dechristianization \times Post-R.C.	-1.130 (0.816)	-0.493 (0.764)	
Dechristianization (cont.) \times Post-R.C.			-0.025 (0.110)
Post-R.C.	-2.708*** (0.981)	-2.891*** (0.911)	-2.963*** (0.883)
Time Trend	0.004 (0.014)	0.010 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)
Non-Labor Conflicts	0.019 (0.015)	0.031* (0.016)	0.031* (0.016)
Observations	3465	3465	3465
Department Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Weights	X		

The dependent variable is the onset of a labor conflict. Logistic regression coefficients are reported in models. Positive coefficients for dechristianization campaigns indicate that if there was a campaign, the probability of a labor conflict was higher. Standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses. + $p < 0.15$ * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table C.5: Predicting Labor Conflict Onset, Placebo for Total Executions

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Executions \times Post-R.C.	-0.930 (0.906)	-0.331 (0.919)	
Executions (cont.) \times Post-R.C.			-0.001** (0.000)
Post-R.C.	-3.052*** (0.658)	-2.730*** (0.506)	-2.482*** (0.854)
Time Trend	0.016* (0.009)	0.010 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)
Non-Labor Conflicts	0.041** (0.021)	0.031* (0.017)	0.028* (0.016)
Observations	3388	3388	3388
Department Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Weights	X		

The dependent variable is the onset of a labor conflict. Logistic regression coefficients are reported in models. Positive coefficients for the number of registers indicate that the more executions there are, the higher the probability of a labor conflict. Standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses. + $p < 0.15$ * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table C.6: Predicting Labor Conflict Onset, Placebo for Lower Class Executions

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lower Class Exec. Execution \times Post-R.C.	-0.785 (0.956)	-0.288 (0.996)	
Lower Class Exec. (Cont.) \times Post-R.C.			-0.001* (0.000)
Post-R.C.	-2.698*** (0.622)	-2.817*** (0.514)	-2.745*** (0.828)
Time Trend	0.009 (0.009)	0.010 (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)
Non-Labor Conflicts	0.031* (0.018)	0.030* (0.016)	0.029* (0.016)
Observations	3465	3465	3465
Department Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Weights	X		

The dependent variable is the onset of a labor conflict. Logistic regression coefficients are reported in models. Positive coefficients for the number of registers indicate that the more lower class executions there are, the higher the probability of a labor conflict. Standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses. + $p < 0.15$ * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table C.7: Predicting Labor Conflict Onset, Placebo for Elite Executions

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Elite Executions \times Post-R.C.	-0.555 (0.890)	-0.468 (0.910)	
Elite Executions (cont.) \times Post-R.C.			-0.003 (0.003)
Post-R.C.	-3.401*** (0.800)	-2.672*** (0.539)	-2.576*** (0.900)
Time Trend	0.018+ (0.011)	0.010 (0.008)	0.011 (0.008)
Non-Labor Conflicts	0.025+ (0.017)	0.031* (0.017)	0.029* (0.016)
Observations	3465	3465	3465
Department Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Weights	X		

The dependent variable is the onset of a labor conflict. Logistic regression coefficients are reported in models. Positive coefficients for the number of registers indicate that the more elite executions there are, the higher the probability of a labor conflict. Standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses. + $p < 0.15$ * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table C.8: Predicting Labor Conflict Onset, Placebo for Registers

	(1)	(2)
Complexity \times Post-R.C.	0.197 (0.674)	0.479 (0.859)
Post-R.C.	-4.425*** (0.902)	-3.332*** (0.599)
Time Trend	0.030** (0.012)	0.013+ (0.008)
Non-Labor Conflicts	0.023* (0.012)	0.025+ (0.016)
Observations	3311	3311
Department Fixed Effects	X	X
Weights	X	

The dependent variable is the onset of a labor conflict. Logistic regression coefficients are reported in models. Positive coefficients for the number of registers indicate that the more complex the administrative apparatus was, the higher the probability of a labor conflict. Standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses. + $p < 0.15$ * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table C.9: Predicting Labor Conflict Onset, Accounting for Alternatives

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intense Enforcement (1.5 weeks) \times Post-R.C.	2.360** (1.169)	2.089* (1.144)		
Intense Enforcement (Top 25%) \times Post-R.C.			2.407** (1.093)	2.095* (1.147)
Execution \times Post-R.C.	-2.085*** (0.675)	-1.807*** (0.690)	-1.973*** (0.704)	-1.790*** (0.684)
Dechristianization \times Post-R.C.	0.157 (0.873)	0.239 (0.857)	-0.024 (0.851)	0.227 (0.848)
Candidate CL \times Post-R.C.	-1.996*** (0.723)	-2.226** (0.924)	-1.954*** (0.744)	-2.246** (0.952)
Social Ties \times Post-R.C.	-0.264 (0.721)	0.104 (0.804)	-0.389 (0.730)	0.003 (0.844)
Missions \times Post-R.C.	-3.375*** (1.136)	-3.248*** (1.184)	-3.383*** (1.170)	-3.263*** (1.176)
Post-R.C.	-0.978 (0.962)	-0.749 (1.073)	-1.171 (1.128)	-0.647 (1.026)
Time Trend	0.020*** (0.007)	0.014+ (0.008)	0.028** (0.013)	0.014+ (0.008)
Non-Labor Conflicts	0.032** (0.015)	0.028* (0.016)	0.023* (0.013)	0.029* (0.016)
Observations	3311	3311	3311	3311
Department Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X
Weights	X		X	

The dependent variable is the onset of a labor conflict. Logistic regression coefficients are reported in models. Positive coefficients for enforcement indicate that the intensity of the enforcement of the Republican Calendar was associated with a higher probability of labor conflicts. Standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses. + $p < 0.15$

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Appendix D: Robustness Checks

Table D.1: Predicting Labor Conflict Onset, Regime Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intense Enforcement (1.5 weeks) \times Post-R.C.	1.955** (0.846)	1.600* (0.900)		
Intense Enforcement (Top 25%) \times Post-R.C.			1.628** (0.816)	1.598* (0.942)
Post-R.C.	-5.484*** (1.023)	-4.773*** (0.813)	-5.338*** (1.021)	-4.699*** (0.810)
Time Trend	0.020 (0.017)	0.025+ (0.016)	0.025+ (0.017)	0.025+ (0.016)
Non-Labor Conflicts	0.032* (0.017)	0.024+ (0.016)	0.021+ (0.014)	0.025+ (0.016)
Observations	3311	3311	3311	3311
Department Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X
Regime Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X
Weights	X		X	

The dependent variable is the onset of a labor conflict. Logistic regression coefficients are reported in models. Positive coefficients for enforcement indicate that the intensity of the enforcement of the Republican Calendar was associated with a higher probability of labor conflicts. Standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses. + $p < 0.15$
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table D.2: Predicting Labor Conflict Onset, Time Trends

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intense Enforcement (1.5 weeks) \times Post-R.C.	1.949** (0.846)	1.593* (0.895)		
Intense Enforcement (Top 25%) \times Post-R.C.			1.586** (0.777)	1.589* (0.936)
Post-R.C.	-7.180*** (1.916)	-5.118*** (0.699)	-6.554*** (1.623)	-5.045*** (0.666)
Non-Labor Conflicts	0.031* (0.017)	0.024+ (0.016)	0.022+ (0.014)	0.024+ (0.016)
Time Trend	-0.058 (0.055)	-0.011 (0.031)	-0.032 (0.035)	-0.011 (0.031)
Time Trend ²	0.005+ (0.003)	0.002* (0.001)	0.003* (0.002)	0.002* (0.001)
Time Trend ³	-0.000+ (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Observations	3311	3311	3311	3311
Department Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X
Weights	X		X	

The dependent variable is the onset of a labor conflict. Logistic regression coefficients are reported in models. Positive coefficients for enforcement indicate that the intensity of the enforcement of the Republican Calendar was associated with a higher probability of labor conflicts. Standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses. + $p < 0.15$

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table D.3: Predicting Labor Conflict Onset, Excluding Agricultural Conflicts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intense Enforcement (1.5 weeks) \times Post-R.C.	1.954** (0.838)	1.465* (0.825)		
Intense Enforcement (Top 25%) \times Post-R.C.			1.580** (0.699)	1.487* (0.850)
Post-R.C.	-4.883*** (0.699)	-4.247*** (0.701)	-5.214*** (0.901)	-4.199*** (0.688)
Time Trend	0.035*** (0.008)	0.027*** (0.009)	0.043*** (0.013)	0.028*** (0.009)
Non-Labor Conflicts	-0.037 (0.036)	-0.055 (0.040)	-0.079+ (0.051)	-0.053 (0.039)
Observations	1589	1589	1589	1589
Department Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X
Weights	X		X	

The dependent variable is the onset of a labor conflict, excluding agricultural conflicts. Logistic regression coefficients are reported in models. Positive coefficients for enforcement indicate that the intensity of the enforcement of the Republican Calendar was associated with a higher probability of labor conflicts. Standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses. + $p < 0.15$ * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table D.4: Predicting Labor Conflict Onset, Excluding the Candidate Cities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intense Enforcement (1.5 weeks) \times Post-R.C.	2.310** (0.926)	1.875* (0.992)		
Intense Enforcement (Top 25%) \times Post-R.C.			1.981** (0.804)	1.793* (1.031)
Post-R.C.	-4.230*** (0.691)	-3.634*** (0.676)	-4.640*** (1.108)	-3.523*** (0.657)
Time Trend	0.018** (0.008)	0.010 (0.008)	0.028+ (0.017)	0.010 (0.008)
Non-Labor Conflicts	0.034* (0.020)	0.028+ (0.018)	0.024 (0.020)	0.029+ (0.018)
Observations	2464	2464	2464	2464
Department Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X
Weights	X		X	

The dependent variable is the onset of a labor conflict. Logistic regression coefficients are reported in models. Positive coefficients for enforcement indicate that the intensity of the enforcement of the Republican Calendar was associated with a higher probability of labor conflicts. Standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses. + $p < 0.15$ * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table D.5: Predicting Labor Conflict Onset, Excluding the Vendée

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intense Enforcement (1.5 weeks) \times Post-R.C.	2.038** (0.850)	1.717* (0.906)		
Intense Enforcement (Top 25%) \times Post-R.C.			1.681** (0.789)	1.699* (0.943)
Post-R.C.	-4.498*** (0.687)	-3.976*** (0.691)	-4.803*** (0.890)	-3.887*** (0.672)
Time Trend	0.020*** (0.008)	0.014+ (0.009)	0.028** (0.013)	0.014+ (0.009)
Non-Labor Conflicts	0.033* (0.017)	0.025* (0.015)	0.022+ (0.014)	0.026* (0.015)
Observations	3234	3234	3234	3234
Department Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X
Weights	X		X	

The dependent variable is the onset of a labor conflict. Logistic regression coefficients are reported in models. Positive coefficients for enforcement indicate that the intensity of the enforcement of the Republican Calendar was associated with a higher probability of labor conflicts. Standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses. + $p < 0.15$

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Appendix E: Limitations and Extensions

Table E.1: Predicting Labor Conflict Onset, 1806-1859

	(1) Labor Conflict	(2) Labor Conflict
Intense Enforcement	0.944** (0.457)	
Intense Enforcement (Top 25%)		1.581** (0.713)
Non-Labor Conflicts	-0.037 (0.092)	-0.028 (0.083)
Time Trend	0.009 (0.009)	0.009 (0.010)
Pre-R.C. Conflicts	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.012)
Distance from Paris	-0.948* (0.530)	-0.814+ (0.516)
1750 City Pop	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003+ (0.002)
Proto-Industrial Activities	1.235** (0.551)	1.431** (0.576)
Nobles 1750	-0.192*** (0.052)	-0.226*** (0.069)
Refractory Clergy	-0.933 (1.229)	-1.462 (1.138)
Girondist Department	0.370 (0.740)	0.587 (0.583)
Montagnard Department	-0.259 (0.857)	-0.368 (0.838)
Missions	-0.679 (0.489)	-1.140* (0.625)
Candidate City	-0.459 (0.545)	-0.317 (0.654)
Constant	1.767 (3.629)	1.618 (3.652)
Observations	2376	2376

The dependent variable is the onset of a labor conflict. Logistic regression coefficients are reported in models. Positive coefficients for implementation indicate that if the implementation of the Republican Calendar was more intense, the greater the probability of a labor conflict. Standard errors clustered at the department level in parentheses. + $p < 0.15$ * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E.2: Predicting Strikes (1864-1935)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All Strikes	All Strikes	Hours	Hours
Intense (1.5 weeks)	0.642** (0.298)		0.647** (0.284)	
Intense (Top 25%)		0.258 (0.306)		0.435 (0.309)
Trend	0.078*** (0.004)	0.077*** (0.003)	0.078*** (0.007)	0.077*** (0.008)
Distance from Paris	0.132 (0.182)	0.063 (0.184)	0.127 (0.210)	0.079 (0.206)
City Pop - Department	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001+ (0.001)	-0.002+ (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)
Montagnard	0.199 (0.378)	0.239 (0.393)	-0.333 (0.451)	-0.267 (0.443)
Girondist	0.146 (0.358)	0.188 (0.358)	0.027 (0.450)	0.118 (0.445)
Missions	0.575** (0.237)	0.632** (0.261)	0.763*** (0.232)	0.796*** (0.243)
Pre-Industrial Activities	0.850*** (0.198)	0.772*** (0.211)	0.688*** (0.183)	0.618*** (0.193)
Nobles 1750	-0.012 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.018)	-0.014 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.019)
Pre-R.C. Conflicts	0.006* (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)
Share Refractory Clergy	-0.297 (0.491)	-0.338 (0.503)	-0.843* (0.476)	-0.856* (0.488)
Constant	-149.583*** (6.583)	-147.992*** (6.527)	-152.633*** (13.484)	-151.122*** (14.150)
lnalpha	1.435*** (0.066)	1.459*** (0.075)	2.383*** (0.084)	2.396*** (0.084)
Observations	5544	5544	5544	5544

Note: The dependent variable is the count of strikes or strikes about hours in a department-year from 1864-1935. Positive coefficients indicate that more intense enforcement of the Republican Calendar is associated with a greater likelihood of an additional strike, consistent with expectations. Negative Binomial Regression coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses across all models. + $p < 0.15$ * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E.3: Predicting Strikers (1864-1935)

	(1) Strike Size All Strikes	(2) Strike Size All Strikes	(3) Strike Size Hours	(4) Strike Size Hours
Intense (1.5 weeks)	0.544** (0.271)		0.813** (0.322)	
Intense (Top 25%)		0.067 (0.302)		0.446 (0.448)
Trend	0.032*** (0.005)	0.031*** (0.005)	0.049*** (0.011)	0.048*** (0.011)
Distance from Paris	0.093 (0.189)	-0.001 (0.188)	0.230 (0.274)	0.094 (0.272)
City Pop - Department	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)
Montagnard	0.123 (0.358)	0.211 (0.385)	-0.449 (0.671)	-0.195 (0.668)
Girondist	0.365 (0.379)	0.429 (0.394)	0.298 (0.739)	0.616 (0.739)
Missions	0.270 (0.213)	0.383+ (0.255)	0.507 (0.356)	0.627* (0.380)
Pre-Industrial Activities	0.948*** (0.193)	0.844*** (0.212)	1.047*** (0.281)	0.827*** (0.315)
Nobles 1750	0.004 (0.015)	0.010 (0.017)	-0.006 (0.027)	-0.000 (0.032)
Pre-R.C. Conflicts	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)
Share Refractory Clergy	0.017 (0.418)	-0.033 (0.441)	-1.531** (0.674)	-1.270+ (0.783)
Constant	-54.849*** (9.380)	-53.962*** (8.959)	-90.089*** (21.609)	-87.960*** (21.703)
Inalpha	1.029*** (0.060)	1.042*** (0.065)	3.481*** (0.058)	3.487*** (0.058)
Observations	1541	1541	1541	1541

Note: The dependent variable is the count of strikes or strikes about hours in a department-year from 1864-1935. Positive coefficients indicate that more intense enforcement of the Republican Calendar is associated with a greater likelihood of an additional strike, consistent with expectations. Negative Binomial Regression coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses across all models. + $p < 0.15$ * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E.4: Predicting Strikes with Candidate Cities (1864-1935)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All Strikes	All Strikes	Hours	Hours
Intense (1.5 weeks)	0.624** (0.291)		0.601** (0.267)	
Intense (Top 25%)		0.220 (0.292)		0.369 (0.291)
Trend	0.077*** (0.004)	0.077*** (0.003)	0.078*** (0.007)	0.077*** (0.007)
Distance from Paris	0.144 (0.181)	0.077 (0.184)	0.143 (0.205)	0.096 (0.202)
City Pop - Department	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.001+ (0.001)	-0.002+ (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)
Candidate CL	-0.154 (0.223)	-0.205 (0.242)	-0.353+ (0.233)	-0.389+ (0.241)
Montagnard	0.232 (0.377)	0.271 (0.398)	-0.258 (0.446)	-0.197 (0.442)
Girondist	0.136 (0.354)	0.158 (0.355)	0.018 (0.437)	0.090 (0.434)
Missions	0.555** (0.227)	0.602** (0.244)	0.713*** (0.221)	0.742*** (0.231)
Pre-Industrial Activities	0.826*** (0.195)	0.742*** (0.210)	0.641*** (0.177)	0.572*** (0.189)
Nobles 1750	-0.010 (0.018)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.009 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.020)
Pre-R.C. Conflicts	0.006* (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.005+ (0.003)	0.005+ (0.003)
Share Refractory Clergy	-0.287 (0.482)	-0.324 (0.490)	-0.815* (0.463)	-0.826* (0.470)
Constant	-149.387*** (6.575)	-147.800*** (6.537)	-152.255*** (13.422)	-150.835*** (14.017)
lnalpha	1.431*** (0.066)	1.454*** (0.075)	2.371*** (0.087)	2.383*** (0.087)
Observations	5544	5544	5544	5544

Note: The dependent variable is the count of strikes or strikes about hours in a department-year from 1864-1935. Positive coefficients indicate that more intense enforcement of the Republican Calendar is associated with a greater likelihood of an additional strike, consistent with expectations. Negative Binomial Regression coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses across all models. + $p < 0.15$ * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table E.5: Predicting Strikes without Candidate Cities (1864-1935)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All Strikes	All Strikes	Hours	Hours
Intense (1.5 weeks)	0.711** (0.357)		0.850*** (0.324)	
Intense (Top 25%)		0.261 (0.388)		0.455 (0.379)
Trend	0.079*** (0.004)	0.079*** (0.004)	0.076*** (0.008)	0.075*** (0.008)
Distance from Paris	0.168 (0.216)	0.102 (0.217)	0.233 (0.232)	0.152 (0.223)
City Pop - Department	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002+ (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
Montagnard	-0.101 (0.487)	-0.046 (0.509)	-0.604 (0.523)	-0.469 (0.515)
Girondist	0.006 (0.500)	0.112 (0.536)	-0.277 (0.576)	-0.107 (0.583)
Missions	0.685** (0.284)	0.874*** (0.339)	0.741*** (0.277)	0.882*** (0.335)
Pre-Industrial Activities	0.908*** (0.227)	0.793*** (0.264)	0.701*** (0.205)	0.574** (0.244)
Nobles 1750	0.006 (0.021)	0.022 (0.025)	-0.005 (0.021)	0.008 (0.024)
Pre-R.C. Conflicts	0.005 (0.004)	0.005 (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)
Share Refractory Clergy	-0.638 (0.631)	-0.732 (0.605)	-1.305** (0.590)	-1.367** (0.563)
Constant	-152.190*** (7.895)	-152.217*** (7.433)	-148.513*** (14.975)	-146.707*** (15.444)
lnalpha	1.404*** (0.068)	1.435*** (0.079)	2.307*** (0.094)	2.334*** (0.097)
Observations	3816	3816	3816	3816

Note: The dependent variable is the count of strikes or strikes about hours in a department-year from 1864-1935. Positive coefficients indicate that more intense enforcement of the Republican Calendar is associated with a greater likelihood of an additional strike, consistent with expectations. Negative Binomial Regression coefficients are reported. Standard errors clustered by department in parentheses across all models. + $p < 0.15$ * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Appendix F: Kernel Density Plots of Inverse Probability Weights

Figure F.1: Balance between All Pre-Revolutionary Conflicts




Figure F.2: Balance between Distance From Paris




Figure F.3: Balance between Proto-Industrial Activities




Figure F.4: Balance between Nobles (1750)




Figure F.5: Balance between City Population




Figure F.6: Balance between Candidate City




Figure F.7: Balance between Share Refractory Clergy




Figure F.8: Balance between Girondist Departments




Figure F.9: Balance between Montagnard Departments





Figure F.10: Balance between Missions



Appendix G: Qualitative Evidence of Measurement Validity

In this section, I present qualitative evidence from primary and secondary sources about the validity of the measure for *Intense Enforcement*. Much of the anecdotal evidence of enforcement is inconsistent and drawn from sources across a smattering of departments. One of the most comprehensively covered cases of the enforcement of the Republican Calendar is the department of Sarthe. Sarthe was a consistent, strong enforcing department (Shusterman 2010, 196-8; Shaw 2011, 99; Reinhard 1936, 349-70). Officials were so intent on regulating labor and rest, they even went so far as to establish patrols to observe labor and rest, then fine non-compliers. These measures were considered “[exceptional]” relative to other departments at the time. In the data that I created, Sarthe is coded as a strong-enforcing department.

By contrast, Vosges is an oft-cited example of relatively weak enforcement. According to Shusterman (2010, 173), “In the Vosges department, municipal agents did not want to enforce the law of 17 thermidor VI, even when people were openly violating it; and, the departmental commissioner added, it was useless to threaten to fire them, as they viewed their jobs as a burden anyway.” Likewise, Wolloch (1987, 383), explains that in Vosges, officials were “obliged” to turn out to civic festivals that were largely empty and plain (translated: “talking to walls” [parlent aux murs]). In most places, the re-scheduling of fairs and markets to coincide with the Republican Calendar was successful, but even then, in Vosges, these fairs were only “generally observed” and this was one of the departments’ most successful enforcement examples with respect to the Calendar (Wolloch 1987, 375).

Additionally, during the Revolutionary Directory period (1795-1799), the Federal Government revisited the enforcement and use of the Republican Calendar. These debates included soliciting opinions from representatives in different departments, some of which are high enforcing and weak enforcing. The Newberry Library contains several digitized pamphlets with these debates and opinions. I reviewed all of the available documents that pertained to these officials’ opinions on the Calendar, and certain patterns emerged.

Individuals from weak enforcement areas suggestions involved: 1) calling for an end to the use of the Calendar (Lanjuinais 1795); 2) dating pre-Calendar years with reference to the establishment

of the French Republic (so 1791 is one year before the Republic, 1790 is two years before the Republic, 1789 is three years before the Republic, and so on) (Sherlock 1798); 3) the official was highly opposed to the Gregorian Calendar and called for establishing another commission to review the use of the Gregorian Calendar in private use or in newspapers (Poullain de Grandprey 1797). None of these directly relates to enforcement procedures, with the most radical request relating to forming a commission.

By contrast, officials from departments coded as high enforcement requested that: 1) rather than rest be required on national holidays and decadis with other days being optionally used for rest, that work be required for all days besides national holidays and decadis, with no rest optional (Bigonnet 1798) and 2) that officials who did not comply with the Calendar be fined at significantly higher rates with substantial punishments (Duplantier 1798). These requests directly relate to high enforcement through raising fines and work expectations. As can be seen, federal representatives from departments I have coded as high enforcement had very strict ideas about compliance and enforcement, whereas officials from weak enforcement areas wanted to change naming conventions or abandon the project altogether.

Appendix H: Qualitative Information on Data

In the *etat civil* (civil status), each record of a unique birth, death or marriage event is called an *acte* (act). *Registres* (registers) contain the sets of *actes* over a geographic space, and at the end or beginning of most registers, there is an alphabetical table listing all of the people to whom the acts pertain. Although almost all registers were handwritten at the time, they have been digitized and are publicly available on commune or department archives websites.⁶

For example, Figure F.11 is an example of an *etat civil* birth act from the prefecture Rouen, in the département Seine-Atlantique. The act only uses Gregorian dates. By contrast, Figure F.12 is from the same register, just five pages later, and exclusively uses the Republican Calendar. The translated text reads: “The Second Year of the French Republic, one and indivisible, 7th day of Brumaire.”⁷ There are no other dates listed in the remaining text of the act and because this is the first act in the register to meet this criterion, it is coded as the date of adoption for the Republican Calendar for the birth registers of the city of Rouen and the département Seine-Atlantique.

Of course, the transition from Gregorian to Republican dates was not always clear. In some places, state officials list the Republican date in the actual text of the acts, but include the Gregorian date in the margins, as Figure F.13 demonstrates. In other places, as demonstrated in Figure F.14, the Gregorian date is listed after the Republican date, occasionally noted as the common era (*ère vulgaire*) or old style (V.S., *vieux style*). Both instances, because they reference the Gregorian Calendar, are not counted as the day of adoption of the Republican Calendar.

⁶Some notable commune documents are missing, but missingness is mostly orthogonal to the research at hand. Records of the *etat civil* from before 1860 are missing from Paris because they were destroyed in the Paris Commune of 1871 (see page 1; archive document http://archives.paris.fr/_depot_ad75/_depot_arko/articles/801/fiche-d-aide-a-la-recherche-ec_doc.pdf). Records of *etat civil* from before 1892 are missing from Saint Lo because they burned in World War II (see archival notice at https://www.archives-manche.fr/e/ad50_etatcivil?). *Etat civil* from what was then the department of Mont-Blanc (now the departments of Savoie and Haute-Savoie) are missing for this period (p. 2; http://archives-en-ligne.savoie.fr/ir_pdf/MOD/AD073_L_IR801_introduction.pdf) because in 1815, Mont-Blanc was ceded to the King of Sardinia (p. 2; http://archives-en-ligne.savoie.fr/ir_pdf/MOD/AD073_L_IR801_introduction.pdf) and according to the Archivist, during the period of French dominion, records keeping was notoriously poor (French: “D’après André Perret, conservateur aux Archives départementales de la Savoie, «ce bouleversement des habitudes, la négligence ou l’incompétence des responsables des registres, l’état troublé de la Savoie ne permirent pas l’enregistrement régulier des actes. C’est surtout dans la tenue et la conservation des doubles qui devaient être adressés à l’Administration centrale du département que la situation était grave. Ils cessèrent parfois d’être tenus ou conservés».” https://patrimoines.savoie.fr/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-06/historique_de_letat_civil_en_savoie.pdf; Page: 3

⁷French: “L’an Second de la Republique Francaise, une et indivisible, Septieme Jour de Brumaire...”

Figure F.11: Example of Etat Civil Registers Using Gregorian Calendar

adelaide Josephine
olympiade
Lefebvre
309

L'an mil sept cent quatre-vingt-trois le 25 octobre
Republique Française de Rouen. Une et indivisible la Vierge
octobre avant midi. Devant moy sousseigne officier public
de la commune de Rouen département de la Seine Inférieure
En compagnie Louis lefebvre Commissaire des predilections
de la Douane Nationale de cette Ville y demeurant et de
sept autres citoyens qui ont été nommés pour accompagner de
ce jour à disigner moi Declare que le jour d'hui nommé d la
ville de Rouen. Contraint en l'année mil sept cent quatre
vingt-trois parvenue au bout de l'année de cette Ville, en l'année
de l'ère républicaine qui ont été données le premier
adelaide Josephine et moi la kiki Vierge Verbal de
ce jour par L'homme Commissaire de police duquel et
notaire que la dite et l'année de l'ère républicaine
Conséquente j'ai de l'ère républicaine parvenue de Louis
d'année Giffroy âgé de cinquante six ans, L'homme
principal de la police de la commune de Rouen
de la Douane Nationale demeurant même maison
Rue de la Vierge Catherine Louise Boulanger âgé
de cinquante trois ans garde meuble demeurant au
chambre de Rouen de l'ère républicaine qui ont signé avec
moy ainsi que le déclare la lecture faite par et j'ai
l'année d'olympiade / quatre-vingt-trois / Un mil sept cent

P. Giffroy & J. Boulanger
off. public

Note: The act only includes the Gregorian calendar, with a date of 25 October 1793, the day after the adoption of the Republican Calendar. Example is from the etat civil birth registers of the prefecture Rouen, Seine-Maritime département; page: 203, document code 4E 02244-1793 Rouen, http://recherche.archivesdepartementales76.net/?id=viewer&doc=accounts%2Fmnesys_ad76%2Fdatas%2Fir%2Fserie_E_seigneuries_familles_notaires_etat_civil%2FFRAD076_IR_E_etat_civil%2Exml&page_ref=2912690&lot_num=1&img_num=1&index_in_visu=

Figure F.12: Example of Exclusive Use of the Republican Calendar

Nominée Elisabeth
 Dot
 521
 L'an Second de la République Française. Le 7
 Indivisible-Septième jour de Brumaire. L'an Second
 L'année moy sousigné officier public de la commune
 de Rouen. Département de la Seine Inférieure. Et
 Comparses Alexandre Ferdinand Dot. Vignere
 Demurant rue Cuvier Numéro quatre Vingt quinze
 Lequel étant accompagné de témoins ay après avoir
 M'a déclaré quel jour d'hier a été célébré et luy est né
 en son domicile le dit son mariage avec Nominée
 Elisabeth Vignere Contracté en l'année mil sept
 Cent quatre Vingt Douze parroisse Saint Jean de
 cette ville En présence du S^r de la commune au quel ont
 été nommés les parrains Nominée Elisabeth, et
 M^r le Substitut du Procureur Verbal de la dite commune
 Le même commissaire de police au quel il a été
 que la dite naissance a été par luy constatée en
 conséquence j'en ai rédigé acte personnel de Georges
 Paschal Dot. âgé de Cinquante ans l'ordonnant
 Pour Ecuyer Numéro dix sept. âgé de son fait
 et de son fait Pierre Blondel âgé de Vingt deux
 ans. Pour Ecuyer Numéro quatre Vingt quinze
 témoins qui ont signé avec moy ainsi qu'il est
 Lecture faite à l'an & jour Sursuiss

Note: An example of the first exclusive use of the Republican Calendar, 7 Brumaire II ("L'an Second de la République Française ... Septième jour de Brumaire"). Example is from the same register as the register from Figure F.11, état civil birth registers of the prefecture Rouen, Seine-Maritime département; page: 208, document code 4E 02244-1793 Rouen, http://recherche.archivesdepartementales76.net/?id=viewer&doc=accounts%2Fmnesys_ad76%2Fdatas%2Ffir%2Fserie_E_seigneuries_familles_notaires_etat_civil%2FFRAD076_IR_E_etat_civil%2Exml&page_ref=2912690&lot_num=1&img_num=1&index_in_visu=

Figure F.13: Example of Republican Calendar Usage with Gregorian Calendar Marginalia

Jean
Bonne
23 9bre 1793
 Acte sous le troisième jour de frimaire II an second de la République
 française une & indivisible atte Jean de Mathis, procureur
 moi Joseph, André Simon Lavergne & d'ainc Membre du
 Conseil général de la Commune d'Agon. Département de
 Lot & Garonne. Ils sont Comptable & état civil des Citoyens
 à Comparu d'un la seule d'la Maison Commune d'Agon
 le Citoyen Jean Bonis Savetier, époux de la Citoyenne Françoise
 Bonchard M & d' François Bat Savetier Majors, & habitant
 d'la présente ville Paroisse St Etienne depuis Nom de D'adieu
 que Marie Savetier son femme ne s'autochise depuis d'la
 d'la sa maison rue Casira fondée Paroisse d'la Mairie de la
 on quel on a donné le Nom d'Agon. Depuis cette déclaration
 que les Citoyens de Nommi ont certifié conforme à la vérité &
 d'la présentation de l'acte qui m'a été faite. j'ai rédigé la
 présent acte que j'ai signé avec ledit Bonchard & mon
 l'ait grand pour l'histoire ainsi que la d'adieu, & le dit Jean,
 de ce lieu. Bonchard Jeanne
 Lavergne & d'ainc off. public.

Note: In the act itself, the Republican date 3 Frimaire II is listed, but in the margins, the Gregorian date of 23 November 1793 ("23 9bre 1793") is listed, indicating the non-exclusive use of the Republican Calendar. Example is from the état civil death registers of the prefecture Agen, Lot-Et-Garonne département; page: 54, document code 2_E_1_2, http://www.archinoe.fr/cg47/visualiseur/registre_visu.php?PHPSID=3b2587383e9c2dab61ecec5b807ef673&id=470034540

Figure F.14: Example of Dual-Use Republican and Gregorian Calendars

12 Brumaire
an 2^e

Le Douzième Jour de Brumaire Brumaire, de l'an
Second de la République, l'ère Vulgaire deux novembre
mil sept cent quatre-vingt treize, Devant moi Jean
Baptiste Saffre, Membre du Conseil Général provisoire
de la Commune de Nantes, Département de la Loire
inférieure, élu pour constater l'état Civil des Citoyens
à comparaître en la maison Commune publie Bourgeoisie
avoir au Tribunal du District, l'acte de naissance
dans l'acte municipalité Election de Sainte Croix
rue Girardin, âgé de quarante ans, natif de la Commune
District de Fleillon au département de la Loire
Devant paraitre Saint Denis de cette Ville au jour
mil sept cent quatre-vingt deux, lequel a été de
premier lieu agri-culteur âgé de cinquante Cinq ans
Demourant dite Election rue Girardin et de seconde
Marie Joseph Dela-Mille aussi agri-culteur âgé de
quarante un an demourant rue de la Croix Election de
Saint Pierre, M'a déclaré que Marie Julienne Ballais
Son épouse légitime âgée de trente-trois ans, native
de la paroisse Sainte Croix de Nantes, est accouchée
en son dudit Domicile hier matin à quatre heures
d'un enfant mâle qu'il m'a présenté et auquel
il a donné le prénom de Gaston. D'après cette
Déclaration que les témoins Cy-dessus ont certifié
vraitable j'ai rédigé le présent acte qui se pose et
les deux témoins ont Signés avec moi un mot rayé
un

Gaston
Bourgeoisie

J. Saffre
M. Saffre
M. Saffre

Note: The act lists 12 Brumaire II ("douze Brumaire") but then immediately follows this with "common era 2 November 1793" (French: "ère vulgaire deux Novembre mil sept cent quatre-vingt treize"). Because the acte includes both the Republican and Gregorian date, this is an example of the non-exclusive use of the Republican Calendar. Example is from the etat civil birth registers of the prefecture Nantes, Section La Montagne et Scevola, Loire-Atlantique département; page: 40, document code 1 E 8, http://www.archives.nantes.fr/PAGES/ENLIGNE/etat_civil/etat_civil.htm