

“Do Good Borders Make Good Rebels?”
Supplemental Information

June 28, 2016

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A Summary and Description of Data

1 Summary Statistics

In [Table A.1](#) below, we present summary statistics for the variables included in the regression models in Table 1 of the manuscript's main text.

Table A.1: Summary Statistics

	Mean	Median	Min	Max	SD
Civilian Casualties	126.13	0.00	0.00	30110	1150.61
Foreign Territory	0.73	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.44
Domestic Territory	0.38	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.49
Battle Deaths (Logged)	4.48	4.86	0.00	12.77	2.97
Central Command Strength	2.08	2.00	1.00	3.00	0.60
Rebel Strength	1.64	2.00	1.00	5.00	0.72
Non-Military Support	0.07	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.25
Rebel Size	8.49	8.69	4.61	13.81	1.46
Population Density	98.19	46.88	2.41	844.55	114.77
Income	7.58	7.53	5.08	10.59	1.14
Income Growth	0.69	1.43	-64.41	51.33	8.37

2 Overview of Temporal Trends in PKK Civilian Victimization

Figure A.1 below presents trends in the Kurdish Workers Party's level of civilian victimization over time for the entire period that the PKK is observed in the Non-State Actors Dataset and for which civilian casualty data are available from the UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset (1989-2003). The vertical lines indicate the beginning of Operation Provide Comfort, which established the Northern Iraq No-Fly-Zone in 1991 and Turkey's 1995 Operation Steel, in which 35,000 Turkish troops invaded Iraq to attack PKK bases in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Similarly, Figure A.2 and Figure A.3 show trends in PKK attacks disaggregated by whether their targets were armed (*e.g.*, security forces, other rebel groups) or unarmed (civilians) and by target type based on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) from 1984-2013 (the entire period for which data are available). As above, the vertical lines indicate the establishment of the northern Iraq No-fly-zone in 1991 and the Turkish invasion of northern Iraq in 1995.

Figure A.1: UCDP One-Sided Violence Data for the PKK




Figure A.2: Attacks by the PKK on Armed and Unarmed Targets (GTD)





Figure A.3: Attacks by the PKK Disaggregated by Target Type (GTD)



3 Foreign vs. Domestic Territorial Control

Table A.2 presents a cross-tabulation of the groups that control domestic territory as opposed to foreign territory. Over 38% of all rebel groups control foreign territory, but no domestic territory, suggesting that our theoretical framework should explain the plurality of cases. On the other hand, about 17% of groups control only domestic territory, and just 18% control both foreign and domestic territory. Groups that control no territory make up the remaining cases and represent about 27% of all insurgencies.

Table A.2: Rebel Territorial Control

	<i>Foreign Territory</i>	<i>No Foreign Territory</i>	TOTAL
<i>Domestic Territory</i>	49	48	97
<i>No Domestic Territory</i>	105	73	178
TOTAL	154	121	275

Note: The table above presents the cross-tabulation of the number of groups controlling foreign territory, domestic territory, both forms of territory, and neither form of territory. As is apparent, the number of groups with Foreign Territorial control is very high, suggesting that our theory generalizes to a large number of insurgent groups.

4 A Note on Battle Deaths and One-Sided Fatalities Data

The One-Sided Fatalities Dataset provides information on the number of civilians targeted by the government or combatants during a civil war in a given year. These data are disaggregated by perpetrator, allowing us to attribute certain casualties to certain insurgencies. Specifically, “One-sided violence is the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths.”¹ The Battle Deaths data is a count of the estimated number of battle deaths, defined such that “battle-related deaths refer to those deaths caused by the warring parties that can be directly related to combat...The target for the attacks is either the military forces or representatives for the parties, though there is often substantial collateral damage in the form of civilians being killed.”² Therefore, while civilians may be counted among battle-related deaths, these counts do not include civilians killed through the specific targeting of civilians identified in the One-Sided Violence Dataset. The correlation between annual battle deaths and the best estimate of one-sided fatalities is 0.0573, suggesting that as the military intensity of war increases, there is only a slight increase in the level of civilian predation.

¹Codebook for [Eck and Hultman \(2007\)](#), pg 2.

²Codebook for [Lacina and Gleditsch \(2005\)](#)

B Robustness Checks

In this section, we present results from robustness checks, as described in the main text. First, as shown in [Table B.1](#) in [section 1](#), we present results employing bootstrapped standard errors. Next, in [section 2](#), we present the results of alternative specifications of fixed effects for our base model, as presented in [Table 1](#) of the article. In [Model 1](#) of [Table B.2](#), we present a model without both country and year fixed effects, to demonstrate that our results are an artifact of neither. [Model 2](#) displays results with only country fixed effects. In [Model 3](#), we show that our results are robust to the substitution of region fixed effects for country fixed effects. Similarly, [Model 4](#) substitutes decade fixed effects for year fixed effects and shows substantively unchanged results.

Next, in [section 3](#), we re-estimate our base model while omitting outliers to address concerns that our results are driven by a small number of influential observations. Outliers are identified using the Cook’s distance (Cook’s D) measure ([Cook and Weisberg 1982](#)). Cook’s D measures the effect of omitting a given observation and is calculated as follows:

$$D_i = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^n (\hat{Y}_j - Y_j(\hat{i}))^2}{p\text{MSE}} \quad (1)$$

where: \hat{Y}_j is the prediction from the full regression model for observation j . $Y_j(\hat{i})$ is the re-estimated prediction for observation j from a regression in which observation i has been omitted. p gives the number of predictors in the model and MSE denotes the mean square error of the regression model. [Table B.3](#) displays results from a

re-estimation of our base model with the omission of observations with Cook’s D scores $> \frac{4}{n}$. We adopt this threshold based on [Bollen and Jackman \(1985\)](#).

To further increase our confidence that our results are robust to the exclusion of outliers, we implement a “jackknife” estimation procedure whereby a model is re-estimated with an observation omitted, as shown above in (1), and this process is iterated until each observation in the sample has been omitted in turn. The mean of the collected estimates then constitutes the final estimate and the standard error of the mean of the collected estimates constitutes the final standard error ([Tukey 1958](#); [Mosteller and Tukey 1977](#)). Results from the jackknife procedure are presented in [Table B.4](#) and show that the results presented in Table 1 of the article do not depend upon outliers.

Next, [section 4](#) presents results from alternative variable codings to ensure that the results reported in the article are not artifacts of our coding procedures. First, in [Table B.5](#), we present results from an alternative coding of our key explanatory variable: rebel foreign territorial control. These results reflect a more restrictive definition of foreign territorial control, where *Foreign Territory* is coded as “1” only for rebels classified by [Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan \(2012\)](#) as possessing “extensive” foreign territorial control. In comparison, our main results presented in the article also codes *Foreign Territory* as “1” if rebels possess “some” foreign territorial control. As depicted in [Table B.5](#), our results are robust to this alternative coding.

Moreover, in our models, we include foreign territorial control and domestic territorial control as distinct variables. Some may argue that these are not the appropriate

reference categories for comparing the different types of territorial control that insurgencies may have. As a result, we construct ordinal indices that combine measures of foreign and domestic territorial control. In Model 1 of Table A.VI below, the variable *Territorial Index 1* ranks insurgencies that control domestic territory only as “1,” ranks insurgencies with both domestic and foreign territory as “2,” and ranks insurgencies with foreign territory only as “3.” We exclude all insurgencies that have neither domestic nor foreign territory. In Model 2 of Table A.VI we include the variable *Territorial Index 2*. In the *Territorial Index 2* measure, insurgencies without any territorial control and domestic territorial control only are coded as “1,” insurgencies with both domestic and foreign territorial control are coded as “2,” and insurgencies with only foreign territorial control are coded as “3.” Finally, the variable *Territorial Index 3* in Model 3 ranks insurgencies that control neither domestic nor foreign territory as “1,” domestic territory only as “2,” both domestic and foreign territory as “3,” and insurgencies with foreign territory only as “4.” Positive and significant coefficients of the territorial indices support our hypothesis that foreign territorial control increases the number of civilian casualties killed as a percentage of total deaths.

Next, in [section 5](#), we present results from model specifications including additional control variables. Because of the prominent relationship of *Ethnic Fractionalization* and *Mountainous Terrain* with conflict outcomes in the literature, we include them in the model presented in [Table B.7](#) ([Fearon and Laitin 2003](#)). Because these variables are time-invariant with respect to countries, we cannot include country fixed effects in this specification, though we include year fixed-effects. Again, our

results are substantively unaffected by the inclusion of additional controls.

Next, we include additional measures of foreign support in [section 5](#). Because foreign monetary aid is predicted to significantly impact the likelihood of civilian predation, we supplement the Non-State Actor Dataset’s coding of foreign support with the UCDP External Support Dataset.³ The *Non-Military Support (Alternative)* variable is a binary variable that replaces any missing observations from the Non-State Actor Dataset’s coding of *Non-Military Support* with data from UCDP’s External Support Dataset. We code observations as having non-military support if the External Support Dataset lists a group as receiving foreign intelligence or external financial aid. Similarly, the *Military Support (Alternative)* variable is a binary variable that replaces any observations coded as missing in the Non-State Actor Dataset with data from the External Support Dataset. We code observations as having military support if the External Support Dataset lists a group as receiving external troops, external joint operations, external arms, external materiel and external training.

In [section 5](#), we also include a measure of whether the group is secessionist. [Fazal \(2013\)](#) finds that secessionist insurgencies are less likely to use terrorism to achieve their goals. Because a group’s long-term goals may incentivize its use of, or abstinence from, strategic violence against civilians, we include a binary measure of whether the group is secessionist (with a “1” signifying the group is secessionist, and a “0” signifying otherwise). Results remain robust to the inclusion of these variables. The *Secessionist* variable is coded as “1” if a group is partially or fully listed as a secessionist group per the NSA Dataset’s “Conflict Type Variable.” The

³Högbladh, Pettersson and Themnér 2011

Secessionist (Broad) variable is coded as “1” if a group is partially or fully listed as a secessionist group, anti-colonial group or anti-occupation group as per the NSA Dataset’s “Conflict Type Variable.”

In [section 5](#), we evaluate whether the way insurgents acquire foreign territorial control affects civilian victimization. Foreign territorial control may be gained in two ways: acquisition due to state absence (no governance in the borderlands) or given as a form of state sponsorship (sanctuary). To evaluate whether the manner in which foreign territory is acquired matters, we use the NSA Dataset and the UCDP External Support Dataset. If insurgencies in the NSA Dataset are coded as having foreign territory and the UCDP External Support Dataset codes these observations as having received territory from a foreign actor, we assume that this territory has been given (*Foreign Territory, Given*). If the NSA Dataset alone codes this observation as having foreign territory, we consider this insurgency to acquire foreign territory through state absence (*Foreign Territory, Acquired*). We include *Foreign Territory, Given* and *Foreign Territory, Acquired* in our model and re-analyze the data. This test is imperfect: the External Support Dataset is missing a significant number of observations, and our sample is reduced by almost half. Second, this coding cannot identify and measure groups that both acquired foreign territory and were given foreign territory. However, results remain robust: both coefficients are positive and significant, or close to significance.

Additionally, in [section 6](#), we include a lagged dependent variable of the log of the best estimate of civilian casualties to account for temporal auto-correlation. Results remain robust.

Finally, in [section 7](#), we present results from Poisson estimations of the models presented in [Table 1](#) of the article. Because our outcome variable, *Civilian Casualties* is a count variable (taking non-zero integer values by necessity), some readers may prefer the Poisson estimator to the OLS estimator employed in the main results. As should be clear from the results presented in [Table B.13](#), our results are substantively unchanged by substitution of the Poisson estimator for OLS.

1 Bootstrapped Standard Errors

Table B.1: Effects of Territorial Control on Civilian Casualties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign Territory	0.71*** (0.24)	0.42** (0.19)	0.65*** (0.19)	0.67** (0.27)
Domestic Territory	-0.58 (0.41)	-0.36* (0.20)	-0.50* (0.26)	-0.50* (0.29)
Battle Deaths	0.18*** (0.04)	0.28*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.20*** (0.04)
Central Command Strength	0.04 (0.30)		-0.27 (0.24)	0.12 (0.28)
Rebel Strength	0.51* (0.28)		0.89*** (0.22)	0.52** (0.23)
Non-Military Support	1.08*** (0.34)		0.80*** (0.28)	1.03*** (0.35)
Rebel Size	-0.00 (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Population Density	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)		0.00*** (0.00)
Income	-0.76 (0.63)	-0.80* (0.44)		-0.51*** (0.15)
Income Growth	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.01)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	No	No
Observations	528	647	579	528
R^2	0.127	0.052	0.162	0.155

Bootstrapped Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

2 Alternative Fixed Effects Specifications

Table B.2: Alternative Fixed Effects Specifications

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign Territory	0.74*** (0.22)	0.70*** (0.24)	0.72*** (0.24)	0.77*** (0.22)
Domestic Territory	-0.47** (0.22)	-0.59** (0.27)	-0.59** (0.27)	-0.35 (0.21)
Battle Deaths	0.27*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.26*** (0.04)
Central Command Strength	0.11 (0.19)	0.06 (0.28)	0.06 (0.28)	0.12 (0.18)
Rebel Strength	0.67*** (0.17)	0.51** (0.25)	0.55** (0.25)	0.71*** (0.16)
Non-Military Support	0.25 (0.36)	1.08*** (0.37)	1.10*** (0.37)	0.43 (0.37)
Rebel Size	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)
Population Density	0.00 (0.00)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
Income	-0.27*** (0.09)	-0.90* (0.54)	-0.91* (0.54)	-0.11 (0.11)
Income Growth	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Constant	0.67 (0.85)	3.91 (3.93)	5.35 (4.00)	-0.70 (1.11)
Country Fixed-Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No
Year Fixed-Effects	No	No	No	Yes
Decade Fixed-Effects	No	No	Yes	No
Region Fixed-Effects	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	528	528	528	528
R^2	0.200	0.103	0.110	0.196

The dependent variable is $\ln(\text{Civilian Deaths})$. All state-level predictors are lagged by one year. Robust SEs in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

3 Influential Observations

Omitting Outliers

Table B.3: Outliers Omitted

	1
Foreign Territory	0.64*** (0.25)
Domestic Territory	-0.94*** (0.26)
Battle Deaths	0.22*** (0.04)
Strength of Central Command	0.13 (0.33)
Rebel Strength	0.43* (0.25)
Non-Military Support	1.33*** (0.37)
Rebel Size	0.00 (0.00)
Population Density	0.01* (0.01)
Income	-0.74* (0.41)
Income Growth	0.00 (0.01)
Constant	3.62 (3.45)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes
Observations	452
R^2	0.613

The dependent variable is $\ln(\text{Civilian Deaths})$. All state-level predictors are lagged by one year. Robust SEs in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Jackknifing

Table B.4: Jackknifed Results

	1
Foreign Territory	0.70** (0.28)
Domestic Territory	-0.59* (0.35)
Battle Deaths	0.17*** (0.04)
Central Command Strength	0.06 (0.32)
Rebel Strength	0.51 (0.34)
Non-Military Support	1.08*** (0.38)
Rebel Size	-0.00 (0.00)
Population Density	0.02*** (0.00)
Income	-0.90 (0.66)
Income Growth	-0.01 (0.01)
Constant	3.91 (4.82)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes
Observations	528
R^2	0.103

The dependent variable is $\ln(\text{Civilian Deaths})$. All state-level predictors are lagged by one year. Robust SEs in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

4 Alternative Variable Codings

Foreign Territory

Table B.5: Alternative Foreign Territory Specification

	1
Foreign Territory (Alternative)	0.72*** (0.26)
Domestic Territory	-0.67** (0.27)
Battle Deaths	0.16*** (0.04)
Central Command Strength	0.20 (0.27)
Rebel Strength	0.46* (0.25)
Non-Military Support	0.95*** (0.37)
Rebel Size	-0.00 (0.00)
Population Density	0.02*** (0.01)
Income	-1.07* (0.55)
Income Growth	-0.00 (0.01)
Constant	5.17 (3.96)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes
Observations	528
R^2	0.101

The dependent variable is $\ln(\text{Civilian Deaths})$. All state-level predictors are lagged by one year. Robust SEs in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B.6: Territorial Indices

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Territorial Index 1	0.74*** (0.17)		
Territorial Index 2		0.38** (0.16)	
Territorial Index 3			0.40*** (0.11)
Battle Deaths	0.18*** (0.05)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)
Central Command Strength	-0.86** (0.36)	0.03 (0.47)	0.01 (0.46)
Rebel Strength	0.83** (0.36)	0.46 (0.40)	0.49 (0.38)
Non-Military Support	1.31*** (0.32)	0.99* (0.51)	1.09** (0.46)
Rebel Size	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Population Density	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Income	-1.35* (0.79)	-0.68 (0.86)	-0.72 (0.85)
Income Growth	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Constant	7.87 (5.31)	3.73 (6.04)	3.52 (5.93)
Country Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed-Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	446	528	528
R^2	0.207	0.118	0.129

The dependent variable is $\ln(\text{Civilian Deaths})$. All state-level predictors are lagged by one year. Robust SEs in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

5 Additional Control Variables

Table B.7: Additional Controls

	1
Foreign Territory	0.64*** (0.22)
Domestic Territory	-0.53** (0.23)
Battle Deaths	0.26*** (0.04)
Central Command Strength	0.12 (0.19)
Rebel Strength	0.57*** (0.18)
Non-Military Support	0.53 (0.36)
Rebel Size	-0.00 (0.00)
Population Density	0.00 (0.00)
Income	-0.47*** (0.14)
Income Growth	-0.01 (0.01)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.08 (0.65)
Mountainous Terrain	-0.45*** (0.11)
Year Fixed Effects	Yes
Observations	528

The dependent variable is $\ln(\text{Civilian Deaths})$. All state-level predictors are lagged by one year. Robust SEs in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Alternative External Support Codings

Table B.8: Effects of Territorial Control on Civilian Casualties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Foreign Territory	0.77*** (0.26)	0.59** (0.23)	0.76*** (0.26)	0.59*** (0.19)	0.60** (0.24)
Domestic Territorial Control	-0.57* (0.33)	-0.54* (0.32)	-0.56* (0.34)	-0.45** (0.21)	-0.45 (0.30)
Battle Deaths	0.19*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.21*** (0.04)	0.21*** (0.03)
Strength of Central Command	0.01 (0.33)	0.02 (0.23)	0.02 (0.33)	0.09 (0.19)	0.09 (0.26)
Rebel Strength	0.69** (0.31)	0.66** (0.29)	0.66* (0.37)	0.70*** (0.21)	0.70*** (0.23)
Rebel Size	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Population Density	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)
Income	-0.81 (0.64)	-0.80 (0.64)	-0.83 (0.65)	-0.45*** (0.12)	-0.44*** (0.14)
Income Growth	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Military Support (Alt)	-0.29 (0.27)		-0.29 (0.29)		-0.02 (0.24)
Non-Military Support (Alt)		0.18 (0.21)	0.18 (0.29)	0.10 (0.22)	0.08 (0.25)
Constant	4.49 (4.77)	4.59 (4.87)	4.76 (4.73)	2.53** (1.17)	2.40* (1.36)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Country Random Effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	528	528	528	528	528
R^2	0.116	0.115	0.117		

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Including Long-Term Goals, with Random Effects

Table B.9: Effect of Foreign Territory on Civilian Casualties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign Territory	0.60** (0.26)	0.60*** (0.22)	0.73** (0.31)	0.82** (0.32)
Domestic Territorial Control	-0.45 (0.28)	-0.45* (0.27)	-0.44 (0.28)	-0.43 (0.30)
Battle Deaths	0.22*** (0.04)	0.21*** (0.04)	0.23*** (0.03)	0.23*** (0.03)
Strength of Central Command	0.10 (0.23)	0.09 (0.19)	0.15 (0.24)	0.17 (0.22)
Rebel Strength	0.71*** (0.20)	0.70*** (0.18)	0.64** (0.27)	0.65*** (0.22)
Rebel Size	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)
Population Density	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)
Income	-0.43*** (0.13)	-0.44*** (0.11)	-0.42*** (0.14)	-0.39*** (0.14)
Income Growth	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Military Support	-0.02 (0.24)	-0.02 (0.22)		
Non-Military Support			0.54 (0.36)	0.51 (0.34)
Non-Military Support (Alternative)		0.08 (0.24)		
Secessionist			-0.33 (0.36)	
Secessionist (Broad)				-0.52 (0.32)
Constant	2.30* (1.20)	2.40** (1.09)	2.05 (1.48)	1.78 (1.36)
Observations	528	528	528	528

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Including Long-Term Goals, with Fixed Effects

Table B.10: Effect of Foreign Territory on Civilian Casualties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign Territory	0.77*** (0.27)	0.76** (0.30)	0.60* (0.31)	0.68* (0.36)
Domestic Territorial Control	-0.57* (0.31)	-0.56 (0.37)	-0.61* (0.32)	-0.58* (0.31)
Battle Deaths	0.19*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.05)
Strength of Central Command	0.01 (0.27)	0.02 (0.25)	0.09 (0.30)	0.05 (0.36)
Rebel Strength	0.69** (0.28)	0.66** (0.29)	0.52 (0.38)	0.51* (0.30)
Rebel Size	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Population Density	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Income	-0.81 (0.62)	-0.83 (0.67)	-0.76 (0.80)	-0.76 (0.60)
Income Growth	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Military Support	-0.29 (0.27)	-0.29 (0.29)		
Non-Military Support			1.06** (0.42)	1.08*** (0.35)
Non-Military Support (Alternative)		0.18 (0.21)		
Secessionist			0.29 (0.34)	
Secessionist (Broad)				0.07 (0.39)
Constant	4.49 (4.76)	4.76 (5.36)	4.48 (5.41)	4.52 (4.53)
Observations	528	528	528	528
R^2	0.116	0.117	0.131	0.130

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Alternative External Territory Codings

Table B.11: Effects of Territorial Control on Civilian Casualties

	(1)
Foreign Territory (Given)	1.77** (0.75)
Foreign Territory (Acquired)	0.88 (0.79)
Domestic Territorial Control	-0.39 (0.70)
Battle Deaths	0.34** (0.16)
Strength of Central Command	-1.36** (0.60)
Rebel Strength	0.91* (0.55)
Rebel Size	-0.00 (0.00)
Population Density	0.03 (0.02)
Income	-1.70 (1.38)
Income Growth	0.01 (0.03)
Non-Military Support (Alt)	-0.22 (0.62)
Constant	9.41 (9.04)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes
Observations	224
R^2	0.224

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

6 Lagged Dependent Variable

Table B.12: Effects of Territorial Control on Civilian Casualties

	(1)
One-Sided Violence (Lagged)	0.37*** (0.07)
Foreign Territory	0.75** (0.32)
Domestic Territorial Control	-0.38 (0.34)
Battle Deaths	0.14*** (0.03)
Strength of Central Command	-0.17 (0.33)
Rebel Strength	0.61* (0.35)
Non-Military Support	0.60 (0.38)
Military Support	-0.47 (0.35)
Rebel Size	0.00 (0.00)
Population Density	-0.00 (0.01)
Income	-0.30 (0.68)
Income Growth	0.00 (0.01)
Constant	1.67 (5.62)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes
Observations	477
R^2	0.264

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

7 Poisson Specifications

Table B.13: Poisson Model Specifications

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foreign Territory	1.22*** (0.33)	0.89* (0.54)	0.55** (0.24)	0.49* (0.28)
Domestic Territory	-1.46*** (0.48)	0.72 (0.52)	-0.71** (0.36)	-0.38 (0.27)
Battle Deaths	0.32*** (0.06)	0.31*** (0.04)	0.40*** (0.06)	0.29*** (0.04)
Central Command Strength	0.70 (0.75)	-0.10 (0.13)		0.39* (0.20)
Rebel Strength	1.12*** (0.23)	0.87*** (0.10)		0.53*** (0.10)
Non-Military Support	-0.39 (0.83)	-1.87*** (0.49)		-1.00** (0.45)
Rebel Size	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)		-0.00*** (0.00)
Population Density	-0.01 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)	-0.00*** (0.00)
Income	-0.46 (0.36)		-0.56 (0.60)	-0.46*** (0.10)
Income Growth	-0.01 (0.01)		-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)
Constant	1.15 (3.10)	0.43 (0.75)	2.44 (4.20)	4.68*** (0.93)
Country Fixed-Effects	Yes	No	Yes	No
Year Fixed-Effects	Yes	No	Yes	No
Observations	528	579	647	528

The dependent variable is a count of total Civilian Deaths. All state-level predictors are lagged by one year. Robust SEs in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

C Synthetic Controls

In this section, we first present the Variable and Unit weights used in the construction of the synthetic controls. [Table C.1](#) presents the Variable weights used while [Table C.2](#) presents the Unit weights.

Table C.1: PKK One-Sided Violence Synthetic Control Variable Weights

Variable Name	Weight
Domestic Territorial Control (1989)	0.296
Rebel Strength	0.07
Rebel Size (log of best estimate)	0.199
Military Support	0.054
Population Density	0.356
GDP per capita (log)	0.025

Table C.2: PKK One-Sided Violence Synthetic Control Unit Weights

Unit Name	Weight
ELN	0.000
FARC	0.000
Kashmir Insurgents	0.154
LTTE	0.000
NPA	0.000
NPFL	0.010
SPLM	0.148
Sendero Luminoso	0.323
URNG	0.365

Next, we present results from an alternative synthetic controls specification. Here, rather than relying on data for PKK-caused civilian fatalities drawn from the UCDP One-Sided Violence ([Eck and Hultman 2007](#)), we employ data on the annual number

of attacks conducted on “unarmed” targets, by non-state armed groups drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (LaFree and Dugan 2007).

Using these data allows us to a further check on the robustness of our finding, since we are able to evaluate the effect of the establishment of the northern Iraq No-Fly-Zone on PKK victimization of civilians in Turkey with not only a new outcome variable, *Attacks on Civilian Targets*, but to construct an alternative synthetic PKK from a different donor universe, as well. In addition, due to data differences between the GTD and UCDP/PRIO data, we construct a different predictive model, relying on a new set of predictive variables in this specification.

Nonetheless, despite differences in the variable and unit weights employed in the GTD synthetic control model (shown in Table C.3 and Table C.4; see also, Table C.1 and Table C.2 above), our results are substantively consistent with those presented in the main text. As the path and gaps plots presented in Figure C.1 and Figure C.2 show, PKK acquisition of foreign territorial control in 1991 was followed by an immediate and dramatic escalation in the group’s victimization of civilians in Turkey. Moreover, the placebo plot shown in Figure C.3 reveals that this effect is unlikely to be an artifact of general trends in violence against civilians. No other group in the donor pool appears to have received a similar treatment in 1991 and the PKK ends the period in 1995 as the largest positive outlier in the sample.

1 Unit and Variable Weights

Table C.3: Variable Weights


Variable	Weights
Population Density	0.07
Regime Durability	0.25
Urbanization	0.10
GDP per capita	0.03
Gov't Share of GDP	0.00
Polity	0.01
ELF (1985)	0.04
Suicide Attacks	0.20
Target Government	0.29

Table C.4: Unit Weights

Group	Weights
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)	0.00
Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC)	0.29
Hizballah	0.25
Irish Republican Army (IRA)	0.00
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	0.38
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR)	0.00
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)	0.00
National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN)	0.00
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)	0.00
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	0.06
Shining Path (SL)	0.02
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)	0.00


2 Path Plot

Figure C.1: Predicted Effects of Territorial Control




3 Gaps Plot

Figure C.2: Predicted Effects of Territorial Control



4 Placebo Plot

Figure C.3: Predicted Effects of Territorial Control



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