

Coding Information for the Insurgent Social Service Provision Dataset

Here, I provide a more detailed and extensive overview of the theoretical framework I developed for determining inclusive versus exclusive service provision, the sources I used to code these data, and some of the challenges that I faced. I then explain why I focused on education and healthcare provision specifically and provide definitions for how I operationalized and coded these measures. I go on to present a set of textual examples that I used to code the dataset. These examples demonstrate how I was able to determine not only whether a rebel group provided education and healthcare but also who benefited from rebels' services. Finally, I conclude with a descriptive overview of the dataset, as well as a graphical presentation of trends in provision overtime.

A Spectrum of Support for Rebels


Support for an insurgency can be conceived as a spectrum of commitment to the insurgency and its goals, with certain civilian groups more or less likely to support and/or join the rebel group. On one hand of this spectrum are active rebel combatants, with never-joiners (such as members of the incumbent regime) on the other end of this spectrum. The majority of the population falls in between these categories. Within this broad center, civilians may be classified as already active supporters of the rebel group with weaker commitments, as neutral civilians with no commitments but who may be otherwise inclined to support and join the insurgency because of the rebel group's political platform, or finally as unlikely supporters and joiners who do not represent an insurgency's core constituency or political community.¹ This spectrum of support is highly similar to how some military officials conceive of popular support in insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, suggesting that this conception of support has useful theoretical and empirical applications.² Figure A.1 below presents this spectrum

¹Stewart and Liou

²Packwood 2009, 71-2


graphically.

Figure A.1: A Spectrum of Support for Insurgencies




The spectrum outlined above, however, is a theoretical construct. In Figure A.2 below, I delineate the observable implications of each of these theoretical categories. I consider neutral non-joining civilians as people who the rebel group explicitly seeks support from and are core members of the insurgency's coalition. For communists, these tend to be peasants, and in some cases, workers. On the other hand, unlikely joiners or supporters would include wealthier merchants or businesspeople, clergy members or traditional leaders, intellectuals or the bourgeoisie. For secessionist or ethnic insurgencies, neutral but likely joiners tend to be co-ethnics, co-religionists or co-linguists. People not of the insurgency's predominant ethnicity, religion or linguistic group represent unlikely joiners. For any rebel group, former supporters of a different insurgency can be classified as unlikely supporters, as would prisoners of war that a rebel group has captured. For some Islamist groups, such as the Taliban, women are unlikely supporters and joiners.

Figure A.2: Observable Implications of a Spectrum of Support



Using these distinctions, I code as inclusive service provision any rebel group that provided to unlikely joiners or beyond. I code as exclusive service provision any insurgency whereby the organization provided only to members of the insurgency, to members of the insurgency and active supporters, or to neutral civilians who may be more likely to join the rebel group (Figure A.3). Although these data represent an attempt to systematically and verifiably code the extensiveness and inclusivity of rebel governance, this measure is imperfect and cannot accurately predict each individual person’s likelihood to be recruited by a rebel group. There may be idiosyncratic reasons that a person who is an unlikely joiner becomes a member of a rebel group. However, on average, the intuition that non-co-ethnics are less likely than co-ethnics to join an ethnic or secessionist insurgency is mostly true. In the same way, peasants are probably more likely to join a communist insurgency than wealthy merchants, on average.

Figure A.3: Operationalizing Inclusive Provision



It is worth noting that inclusive and exclusive service provision are not mutually exclusive. Even when providing inclusive services, insurgencies can also provide exclusive services simultaneously. In these cases, rebels provide services in tiers. More active and dedicated supporters receive higher quality education or training, including being sent abroad to study. Unlikely joiners receive basic literacy classes and rudimentary healthcare, but receive education and healthcare nonetheless. Therefore, the provision of inclusive services is not an indication that the insurgency prefers unlikely supporters over loyal members. An example of this tiered system

is the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), whose education services are described as “literacy for all, quality education for some.”³ For its strongest and most committed adherents, the PAIGC offered high quality education in the capital Conakry or offered scholarships to study abroad. For everyone else, the PAIGC provided minimal public schooling throughout the country.⁴ In these lower quality facilities, the PAIGC provided basic education and literacy courses, but little more. In other words, although a rebel group provided inclusive services, this by no means implies that it privileged unlikely joiners over committed followers. Rather, insurgencies could provide high quality, exclusive services for recruitment and retention purposes, and yet rebels could still also provide services to the population writ large, including unlikely supporters.

These data are time-variant and capture changes in when rebel organizations began providing services or stopped. In most cases, specific dates for when services were provided was available in the text. Other times, texts would say that “by a given year” or “in the mid-1980s” (for example), a rebel group would have established social service institutions. In these cases, all years before that particular period of time are coded as missing. Additionally, some rebel groups also changed their level of provision. This typically occurred after an insurgency controlled territory: for example a rebel group might have only provided education and health to its cadres until the organization captured territory. Once the insurgency controlled territory, the rebel group might have started to provide services more broadly to civilians living in the territory it captured. In some rare cases, such as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in China in 1948, or Hezbollah after 1991, education moved from neutral supporters to more inclusive provision of unlikely joiners.

To code these data, I relied primarily on secondary literature, especially secondary case histories on each rebel group. I also relied on newspaper and magazine articles collected through Lexis Nexis or Google web searches, journal articles, archival documents, testimonies, reports and memoirs. Because I code service provision in refugee camps, some NGOs such as Amnesty

³Dhada 1993, 97

⁴Dhada 1993, 106-7

International or INGOs such as the United Nations had rich data on the governance of these refugee camps. Feminist accounts of the rebellion tended to have the best data: women were often asked to perform these service-providing roles and would detail the inclusivity and extent of rebel service provision. To the best of my abilities, I triangulated my coding with as many sources as possible. These sources were mostly written in English, but I did use other sources written in Spanish and French. These language choices mirror those selected by Shapiro.⁵ The data coding process took place between October 2013 and October 2014.

If I found data that the rebel group provided services, but could not find information on exclusion, I coded the observation as missing, but coded an insurgency as providing any education or health in a separate variable not used for this analysis. This was the case for five different insurgencies. Because excludability is critical to the research question of this manuscript, observations without information on exclusion are coded as missing in the current analysis. If any observations were unclear or marginally inclusive or exclusive, I created a second, alternative coding and I use this measure as a robustness check (Appendix Table ??).

Focus on Education and Healthcare Provision

The dataset focuses on the provision of education and healthcare specifically. I use these services for three reasons. The first is that there is great variation in insurgent services provision, and I needed services that were comparable across time and space. As an example of this variation, insurgencies have provided everything from food aid or “justice” to building hydroelectric power plants (Burmese Communist Party).⁶ Due to the variation in the types of services insurgencies provide, I limit my focus to education and healthcare to ensure that I am comparing similar services across space and time. Education and healthcare are two such services that are comparable across cases and across time. A literacy or mathematics course in the 1970s in Africa will be similar to mathematics or literacy courses in Asia in the 1950s or in Latin America in the 1980s. Similarly, because what is generally healthy for one person is

⁵Shapiro 2013

⁶Lintner 1990, Appendix II

likely also going to be beneficial for another person anywhere else in the world, or at any other time since 1945, healthcare is broadly similar across space and time.

The second reason I focus on these two services is that education and healthcare are broadly desirable to all people and services from which all people can benefit. As a result, exclusion from these services clearly demonstrates the populations to which the insurgency is or is not providing social services. For example, insurgencies such as the Front for the National Liberation of Congo (FNLC) may provide food to the starving or most impoverished.⁷ Yet, because the majority of people are not starving or impoverished, they may be ineligible to receive these services at any given point. Because the social services data I collected also takes into account who can benefit from services, I do not examine any services from which people might be ineligible to receive, however reasonable their exclusion. If an insurgency offered food to some civilians, and not others, it would be difficult to determine if the insurgency was limiting its provision to only those with economic need, or if the insurgency limited its provision to people with both economic need and who were likely to support the insurgency. Therefore, I do not code any social service that might exclude members of the population, however reasonably, to ensure the greatest accuracy possible. Education and healthcare do not suffer from this exclusion problem, as ostensibly anyone at any time could benefit from education or healthcare.

Finally, all people have a reasonable expectation of receiving, either freely or in a deeply subsidized form, education or healthcare. Education and healthcare are codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the vast majority of countries, education is constitutionally guaranteed and guaranteed to be free.⁸ Almost all countries have free or compulsory education.⁹ Although healthcare is sometimes more complicated (particularly in countries like the United States), governments in almost all countries still allocate resources to subsidize and supplement healthcare throughout their state.¹⁰ Although these services are not always considered classic state-provided public goods (like national security or justice), people have a reasonable

⁷Los Angeles Times 1977; Wright 1977

⁸World Policy Center 2016

⁹Tomasevski 2001, 32-80

¹⁰World Bank 2016

expectation of receiving these services from the state with little to no cost to themselves.

Below, I delineate how I defined “provision,” “education” and “healthcare” while coding.

Provision:

I code insurgencies as “providing” services if they diverted their personnel and financial resources to ensure that a certain group of people received education and healthcare. This typically manifests in two ways:

1. Insurgencies offered education or healthcare themselves through their construction of schools, development of curriculum, service as teachers and doctors, or building of hospitals as needed.
2. Insurgencies ensured that services continued to operate in the area they controlled, typically through the administration and financing of these services, although these institutions already existed.

I do not code groups as providing services if they allow an NGO, religious group, or the incumbent government to provide services in the areas they control, but the insurgencies themselves did not contribute to this provision. For example, the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) allowed the Sri Lankan government to continue its healthcare provision in the areas the LTTE controlled. The LTTE taxed this service, but was not involved in the direct administration of it. As a result, I do not consider the LTTE to have provided healthcare services.¹¹

Education:

In the context of a civil war, insurgents or authors of secondary source texts could use the term “education” ambiguously, and may refer to propaganda campaigns or general military training as education. If the insurgent organization itself or the secondary literature refers to an insurgency as “training” recruits or supporters, and not educating them, I do not consider this to be education. If what the insurgency is providing is not described as training, then I code education as the instruction of skills that can be applied outside of the context of the military operations, such as language, mathematics, or history. If these skills are applicable

¹¹Mampilly 2011, 118-9

to both the insurgents' military goals as well as useful outside the context of the insurgency, such as teaching mathematics so that insurgents know how many explosives to use and how to budget resources, I still code this as education. A clear example of education provision is exemplified by the following passage: Hezbollah's "Educational Center of the Martyr Bojeii opened in 1992 in the village of Mashghara. . . [I]t has nineteen sections covering both nursery and elementary classes and also serves the children of seven neighboring villages."¹² On the other hand, the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) has an education ministry in their structure, but no texts referred to their explicit provision of education to insurgent members or civilians.¹³ From this information above, it is not clear if the NSCN education ministry developed education policy, created propaganda campaigns or actually provided education to others. As a result of this ambiguity, I code this entry as missing.

Healthcare:

I code an insurgency as providing healthcare if the insurgency offered medical treatment. Because of the influence of Mao and China's sponsorship of liberation movements in the Middle East and Africa, some insurgencies provided acupuncture to the populations under its control. Even if an insurgency provided acupuncture, such as the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), I consider the group to provide healthcare.¹⁴ This is to avoid a bias in coding medical care as only "Western" medical practices.

Examples of coding

To demonstrate more clearly how these data were coded, I present examples that demonstrate exclusive or inclusive provision. For rebels that provided exclusive services, I rely on the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), Zimbabwe's African People's Union (ZAPU), and the case of Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP). For insurgencies that provided to unlikely joiners (inclusive services), I present the case of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front

¹²Jaber 1997, 164

¹³South Asian Terrorism Portal 2014

¹⁴Tadesse 1998, 368-9

(EPLF).

1. **Exclusive provision to only combatants: The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN).** The evidence I found for the FSLN supports the idea that the guerrillas only provided education within their own camps. The text below is an excerpt from a newspaper report. A journalist from the *St. Petersburg Times* visited a Sandinista hideaway. There, guerrillas had classes and learned basic mathematics, albeit for the purpose of learning how to calculate the appropriate amount of explosives to use in certain situations. From the report:

“Our reporter was taken to the camp by Eden Pastora, the famous “Commander Zero” of last summer’s attack on the National Palace in Managua . . . The guerrillas are almost all young. Many are seasoned combat veterans by the time they reach age 20. . . . The guerrillas sleep in an area that doubles as a classroom during daylight hours. The day begins at 4:45am . . . The Commandos train in the field until the afternoon rains arrive, and they take cover for weapons instruction. **Men who have never mastered simple mathematics are trained to compute such essential calculations such as the proper charge to blow up a bridge, or a tree, or a house.** The training does not end at nightfall. Squads of men hold political meetings to discuss the principles for which they are fighting.”

As the quote demonstrates, guerrillas living in the camps in 1978 were learning mathematics, albeit for military purposes, but nonetheless received some education. This supports my coding of the FSLN as providing exclusive services to only combatants in 1978. Because no other texts mention the FSLN providing services outside its core guerrilla camp, we can be reasonably confident that education was primarily restricted to group members.

2. **Exclusive provision to only supporters and combatants: Zimbabwe’s African People’s Union (ZAPU).** The case of ZAPU represents an insurgency that provided

services to supporters and members. ZAPU provided these services within a refugee camp, the only place they were able to hold territory.¹⁵ During the war, “the Rhodesian regime retaliated ever more viciously and the civilians became the victims. The majority supported the guerrillas” and they fled across the borders where they became “ZAPU refugees” primarily in one of two refugee camps: Victory Camp and JZ Moyo Camp.¹⁶ Though the camp was poorly equipped initially, “ZAPU did eventually have good medical provision for the refugees in the camps and did make an effort to avoid those problems which might be caused by poor sanitation or poor hygiene.”¹⁷ ZAPU did not control territory outside of the refugee camp, and no other textual evidence indicated more extensive or inclusive provision elsewhere. As is clear from the text, ZAPU supporters fled to the refugee camp and became “ZAPU refugees.” Because ZAPU only provided to supporters and members, its services are exclusive.

3. **Exclusive provision to neutral civilians: The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Front (EPRP).** The EPRP was a communist group. Therefore, the EPRP’s primary political base, the people most likely to support the EPRP’s political platform and the people most likely to be targeted for recruitment were rural peasants. For peasants lacking any education, the EPRP conducted literacy campaigns while more advanced recruits “conducted political discussion sessions on a regular basis and departments prepared reading materials.”¹⁸ In addition, the EPRP “had its own clinic where members and peasants were treated. The clinics were staffed by medical doctors, pharmacists, qualified health officers and nurses.”¹⁹ One of the common treatments the EPRP administered to both its members as well as civilians was acupuncture. Acupuncture was “introduced by [EPRP] members who had been trained by Chinese medical groups in South Yemen who in turn trained others.”²⁰ The EPRP gained considerable popularity among the peasantry

¹⁵Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009

¹⁶South African History Archive 2016

¹⁷South African History Archive 2016

¹⁸Tadesse 1998, 366

¹⁹Tadesse 1998, 368

²⁰Tadesse 1998, 368

because of its acupuncture treatments and their seeming effectiveness. Moreover, the EPRP in the western part of the Begemidir province of Ethiopia also established abortion clinics.²¹ The text here demonstrates that the EPRP provided services to neutral civilians and members, making the distinction in the text between “members” and “peasants.” The text itself was written by a member of the EPRP as well, and thus had inside knowledge of the EPRP’s behavior. More inclusive provision was not mentioned in any other texts by the EPRP, and thus we can be assured that the EPRP’s provision though extensive, was nonetheless exclusive.

4. **Inclusive provision to unlikely joiners: The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF).** Eritrea has nine different ethnicities and two major religions (Islam and Christianity). Ethnicities tended to fall along religious lines. The EPLF was primarily a Christian organization and drew many of its core supporters from co-religionists. The EPLF also fought against the rival secessionist organization, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). The ELF was primarily Muslim. Therefore, Muslims would be unlikely supporters. Moreover, the EPLF was a communist organization, so conservative, wealthier merchants and businesspeople were also unlikely supporters. Finally people living in towns previously controlled by the ELF or people who were ELF supporters would be unlikely to join or support the EPLF. Pool²² provides an overview of the EPLF’s 1977 conquest of a town in Eritrea called Keren. Keren was very conservative, wealthy and had a larger Muslim population. Additionally, the ELF, the main rival of the EPLF, had previously maintained a significant presence and support there,²³ and the ELF propaganda had led some of the local population to nickname the EPLF the “Eritrean Derg.”²⁴ As a result, Keren “was a more difficult proposition” for liberation by the EPLF than other towns.²⁵ Despite these challenges, the EPLF proceeded with liberation and reconstruction, and implemented a series of wage reforms, price controls, taxes and education and healthcare

²¹Tadesse 1998, 369

²²Pool 2001

²³Pool 2001, 121

²⁴Pool 2001, 123

²⁵Pool 2001, 123

initiatives that became very popular. One member of the town:

“[S]tate[d] that even the bourgeoisie was pleased with liberation. They had expected the EPLF to be like the Derg, but it was not because their property and riches were preserved. The EPLF placed great stress on the provision of services. Keren hospital, badly damaged during the fighting, was repaired and reopened. An EPLF clinic with an EPLF doctor was attached to the hospital and medical supplies were brought from the central pharmacy. Increasingly, rural people with serious conditions were referred to Keren hospital by squad doctors operating in the surrounding areas. Schools were reopened and continued to function despite the fact that teachers’ salaries were not coming through from Asmara [the Ethiopian-controlled capital of Eritrea]. The EPLF succeeded to the array of local taxes and levies collected by the Ethiopian government: rent from nationalized properties, charges for veterinary checks on animals brought for sale in the market, for example. Ethiopian taxes were diverted for the provision of goods and services.”²⁶

The quote above demonstrates that the EPLF provided services to unlikely supporters or joiners of the rebel group, and this was a systematic approach to governance. In addition to providing to unlikely joiners, the EPLF also provided education and healthcare to *Ethiopian* prisoners of war.²⁷ Because these soldiers were Ethiopian and would never benefit from the Eritrean after the war, this is another indication of provision to people unlikely to support the rebel group.

²⁶Pool 2001, 124-5

²⁷Wilson 1991, 91

Descriptive Overview of Insurgent Social Services Dataset


The Insurgent Social Services Dataset contains 304 unique rebel groups.²⁸ Of these, 103 insurgent groups provided some form of education, or approximately 34% of rebel groups provided any education between 1945 and 2003. Nearly 48%, or 146 groups, provided no education, and 54 groups have missing observations (18%). Of the total observations, 894 insurgency-years experience education provision, meaning that 37% of all insurgency-years included education provision.

Correspondingly, approximately 101 groups provided healthcare, meaning that about 33% of insurgencies provided healthcare, while 141 insurgencies provided nothing, or 45%. For 62 groups, or 21% of insurgencies, the data are missing. Approximately 33% of all observations experience healthcare provision, or about 794 insurgency-years.

Most insurgencies either provided no education and no healthcare, or provided both education and healthcare. Just 7% of insurgencies provided healthcare but not education, and just 5% of insurgencies provided just education but not healthcare. About 95% of groups that provided education inclusively also provided and healthcare inclusively.


²⁸Some of these cases are somewhat challenging to code because many had considerable autonomy, if not outright independence before the civil conflict began. These states tend to be former Soviet (Nagorno-Karabagh, South Ossetia) or Yugoslav (Croatia, Serbia, etc.) states, or states that were occupied by the Japanese in World War II, granted independence when the Japanese knew they were losing, then were retaken as colonies by victorious European states. This group of cases with considerable autonomy includes: Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dniestr Republic, Independent Mining State of South Kasai, Indonesian People's Army, Katanga, Lao Issara, Palestine National Authority (PNA), Popular Front, Republic of Abkhazia, Republic of Biafra, Republic of Chechnya, Republic of Dagestan, Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, Republic of South Moluccas, Republic of South Ossetia, Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Serbian Republic of Krajina.

Figure A.4: Annual Total Insurgent Education Provision, Globally 1945-2003




Note: The figure demonstrates the number of insurgencies providing education globally from 1945-2003.

Figure A.5: Annual Insurgent Education Provision, Globally 1945-2003




Note: The figure demonstrates the annual level of insurgent education provision globally from 1945-2003.

Figure A.6: Annual Total Insurgent Healthcare Provision, Globally 1945-2003



Note: The figure demonstrates the number of insurgencies providing healthcare globally from 1945-2003.

Figure A.7: Annual Insurgent Healthcare Provision, Globally 1945-2003



Note: The figure demonstrates the annual level of insurgent healthcare provision globally from 1945-2003.

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