

Appendix For:
Explaining Variation in Political Leadership by
Marginalized Groups: Black Officeholding and
“Contraband Camps”

Megan A. Stewart & Karin E. Kitchens

Contents

1 Appendix	1
1.1 Additional Tables and Figures	1
1.2 Sensitivity Tests	5
1.3 Investigating Dosage	8
1.4 Changing the Functional Form of Models	10
1.5 Alternative Outcome Measures	12
1.6 Accounting for Migration and Changing Demographics	15
1.7 Antebellum Religious Institutions	22
1.8 Qualitative Evidence of Mechanisms	24
1.9 Additional Data on Black Elected Officials	28

List of Figures

1.1 Contraband Camps by County	1
1.2 Standardized differences in matched data	2
1.3 Camps and Neighboring Counties	2
1.4 Counties with Contraband Camps Elect About Two More Black Officials	3
1.5.1 Alternative Outcome Measures	14
1.6.1 Black Population Size and Elected Officials, By Camp Presence	15
1.6.2 Change in Population Size from 1860 to 1870	17
1.6.3 Histogram of Change in Population Size from 1860 to 1870	17


List of Tables

1.1 Summary of Key Covariates (Primary Models)	4
1.2 Summary of Additional Covariates	4
1.2.1 Only Local Officeholders	6
1.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis	7
1.3.1 Dosage with Black Elected Officials	9
1.4.1 Altering the Functional Form of Models	11
1.5.1 Summary of Alternative Outcome Measures	12
1.5.2 Alternative Outcome Measures	13
1.6.1 Majority Black Counties	16
1.6.2 Removing Most Populous Counties	18
1.6.3 Accounting for Migration	19
1.6.4 Excluding Counties with the Most Black Elected Officials	20
1.7.1 Antebellum Religious Institutions	23

1 Appendix


1.1 Additional Tables and Figures

Figure 1.1: Contraband Camps by County



Note: The figure shows changes in county boundaries and location of contraband camps.

Figure 1.2: Standardized differences in matched data



Note: The figure on the left shows the reduction in standardized differences using propensity score matching. The figure on the right uses mahalanobis matching.

Figure 1.3: Camps and Neighboring Counties





Figure 1.4: Counties with Contraband Camps Elect About Two More Black Officials



The coefficient on the treatment variable, Contraband Camp, is plotted with the 90% and 95% confidence interval.

Table 1.1: Summary of Key Covariates (Primary Models)

	Contraband Camp		No Camp		Difference	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	β	t
Land inequality 1860	0.48	0.09	0.47	0.10	-0.02	(-1.74)
Population 1860	13517.35	12060.86	9355.83	11326.47	-4161.51**	(-3.30)
Farm Value 1860	256.58	203.14	191.81	115.60	-64.78**	(-3.12)
% Free Black Pop. 1860	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.03	-0.02***	(-3.67)
% Enslaved Pop. 1860	0.43	0.23	0.28	0.22	-0.15***	(-6.42)
Cotton suitability 1860	0.45	0.11	0.46	0.16	0.02	(1.30)
Rail Access	0.41	0.49	0.29	0.45	-0.12*	(-2.34)
Water Access	0.78	0.42	0.42	0.49	-0.36***	(-7.99)
Confederate Battle Deaths	1053.44	3042.86	161.48	1487.45	-891.96**	(-2.87)
Union Battle Deaths	894.04	2858.26	192.44	2169.79	-701.61*	(-2.37)
Battles	0.97	1.63	0.18	0.79	-0.79***	(-4.77)
Observations	98		1197		1295	

Table 1.2: Summary of Additional Covariates

	Contraband Camp		No Camp		Difference	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	β	t
Freedmen's Bureau Office	0.76	0.43	0.27	0.45	-0.48***	(-10.55)
Union Troop Occupation	0.82	0.39	0.38	0.48	-0.44***	(-10.53)
Anti-Slavery Inst.	0.99	2.37	0.75	2.22	-0.25	(-0.99)
Anti-Slavery Inst. (Binary)	0.45	0.50	0.35	0.48	-0.10	(-1.92)
Majority Black	0.41	0.49	0.21	0.41	-0.20***	(-3.80)
Observations	98		1197		1295	

1.2 Sensitivity Tests

In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of our results. First, we re-estimate our central analysis using county-level counts of Black officeholders in local-level positions. These tests ensure that our estimates are not driven by officeholders who competed in state-wide or multi-county elections. To identify this set of officeholders, we exclude all officials who exclusively held positions above the local level. These positions included positions like State Superintendent, Secretary of State, and State Senate. In total, we exclude 63 elected officials who were elected exclusively to offices at the state level position or above, affecting 45 counties. We did not exclude State House positions as they represent smaller geographic regions. State House representatives are also one of the largest categories of office holding, with 572 elected officials in that category.¹

Results are robust to this change, although slightly smaller in magnitude. In our matching model, the coefficient on camps is 1.79, and the associated bootstrap standard error is 0.66 (p-value= 0.007). We also re-run the model (column 3) and include neighboring county in the regressions. The coefficient on camps is 0.93 and the associated bootstrap standard error is 0.477 (p-value=0.051).

Second, we conducted a simulation-based sensitivity analysis using the Stata program *sensatt* that implements the sensitivity analysis for propensity-score matching estimators proposed by Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini (2006) and Nannicini (2007). We simulated how robust our results are to two potential confounders: waterway access and rail access. One small issue is that this program does not have mahalanobis matching as an option for propensity-score matching, which is what we use in the main analysis. To ensure comparable estimates, we first re-run our main analysis with nearest-neighbour matching. We then run two separate analyses that simulate deviations in potential confounders. Further, simulations can only be done on a binary variable. The goal is to investigate how sensitive our estimate of contraband camps is with respect to the possible existence of an unobservable variable that affects both the potential outcome *Black Officeholders* and the selection into treatment. Appendix Table 1.2.2 displays the results.

The first column shows results using nearest-neighbor matching, which produces a slightly larger (but not statistically different) coefficient on contraband camps than our results relying on mahalanobis distances. The next two columns report the estimated average treatment effect on treated (ATT) with simulated confounder and between-imputation standard errors. To show the characteristics of the failure of the Conditional Independence Assumption, the estimated effect of the potential binary confounder on the selection into treatment, *selection effect*, and the estimated effect of confounder on the outcome of untreated subjects, *outcome effect*, are also reported. They are odds ratios from logit estimations. Both simulations produce positive and statistically significant coefficients on camps (though these coefficients are slightly smaller than our main text results). Simulations with waterway access do show high selection effects, but the selection effect does not erase the relationship between contraband camps and Black elected officials. Rail access does not have strong selection effects.

¹Some individual officeholders served in offices at multiple levels. Often, they started out at the local level and then moved to state-wide offices. Because our data are structured as counties (not as individuals), we did not exclude individuals who held any local office in our counts, even if they later served in higher-level offices. In other words, any official who held any local office was kept in our county-level count of Black officeholders.

Table 1.2.1: Only Local Officeholders

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Local office	Local office	Local office
	(Matching)	(OLS)	(OLS)
Camps	1.786*** (0.663)	1.276** (0.529)	0.930* (0.477)
Neighbor County			-0.687*** (0.232)
Land inequality 1860		0.156 (1.068)	0.315 (0.999)
Population 1860		2.52e-05 (1.68e-05)	2.52e-05 (1.66e-05)
Farm Value 1860		-0.000294 (0.00144)	-0.000117 (0.00135)
% Free Black Pop. 1860		8.405 (7.240)	8.760 (7.096)
% Enslaved Pop. 1860		4.009*** (0.856)	4.212*** (0.983)
Cotton suitability 1860		-2.096*** (0.675)	-2.039*** (0.638)
Rail Access		0.648** (0.318)	0.633** (0.317)
Water Access		0.422* (0.222)	0.487** (0.232)
Confederate Battle Deaths		-0.000306 (0.000389)	-0.000299 (0.000388)
Union Battle Deaths		7.18e-05 (0.000347)	7.17e-05 (0.000345)
Battles		1.024 (0.739)	1.068 (0.745)
Constant		-0.240 (0.436)	-0.293 (0.430)
Observations	1,264	1,295	1,295
R-squared		0.214	0.221
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X

Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 1.2.1 re-estimates our main matching and OLS regression models while taking Black local officials as the outcome measure. Column 1 presents the results from matching estimates while Column 2 presents our main results using OLS regression. Column 3 presents the same regression results from Column 2 but includes an indicator for whether a county neighbored a treated county. All models use state fixed effects and bootstrapped standard errors. Positive coefficients for our independent variables indicate support for our hypothesis.

Table 1.2.2: Sensitivity Analysis

	Nearest Neighbor No simulation	Waterway Access Simulation	Rail Access Simulation
Contraband Camp	2.41*** (0.994)	1.56*** (0.46)	1.65*** (0.49)
Outcome effects		1.99	4.35
Selection Effects		5.13	1.47

Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Both the outcome and the selection effect are odds ratios from logit estimations.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

References

- Ichino, A, Mealli, F, and Nannicini, T. "From temporary help jobs to permanent employment: what can we learn from matching estimators and their sensitivity. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor." .
- Nannicini, Tommaso. "Simulation-based sensitivity analysis for matching estimators." *The stata journal* 7.3 (2007): 334–350.

1.3 Investigating Dosage

We lack data on the population size of contraband camps. In lieu of this information, we investigate whether counties with more camps elected more Black officials, an implication consistent with our theoretical expectations. Results support expectations and are reported in Table 1.3.1 below.

Table 1.3.1: Dosage with Black Elected Officials

	(1) Dosage	(2) Dosage and Neighbor
Number of Camps	0.910*** (0.279)	0.839*** (0.251)
Neighbor County		-0.557** (0.245)
Land inequality 1860	0.280 (0.963)	0.382 (0.894)
Population 1860	2.29e-05 (1.68e-05)	2.28e-05 (1.66e-05)
Farm Value 1860	-0.00113 (0.00115)	-0.000959 (0.00108)
% Free Black Pop. 1860	8.511 (8.046)	8.611 (7.850)
% Enslaved Pop. 1860	4.203*** (0.952)	4.340*** (1.045)
Cotton suitability 1860	-1.882*** (0.605)	-1.837*** (0.577)
Rail Access	0.693** (0.318)	0.679** (0.315)
Water Access	0.407* (0.235)	0.452* (0.241)
Confederate Battle Deaths	-0.000340 (0.000399)	-0.000341 (0.000398)
Union Battle Deaths	7.87e-05 (0.000287)	8.33e-05 (0.000287)
Battles	1.032 (0.772)	1.063 (0.774)
Constant	-0.250 (0.405)	-0.280 (0.399)
Observations	1,295	1,295
R-squared	0.248	0.253
States	16	16
State FE	X	X

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 1.3.1 re-estimates our main model but investigates whether counties with more camps elected more Black officials. Rather than rely on a binary indicator of camp presence as in our main results, we use a count of the number of camps in the county. The reported coefficients are OLS regression estimates that use state fixed effects and bootstrapped standard errors. Positive coefficients for our independent variables indicate support for our hypothesis.

1.4 Changing the Functional Form of Models

To ensure that results are not merely an artifact of the functional form of the model we use, we re-estimate our analysis using negative binomial (column 1) and Poisson estimators (column 2). We also investigate whether counties with camps were more likely to elect *any* Black official, and we test this proposition using logistic regression (column 3). Results support expectations and are reported in Table 1.4.1 below.

Table 1.4.1: Altering the Functional Form of Models

	(1) Negative Bin.	(2) Poisson	(3) Logistic
Camps	0.696** (0.271)	0.671*** (0.183)	0.688** (0.299)
Land inequality 1860	3.253** (1.315)	1.722* (0.894)	2.384 (1.742)
Population 1860	5.86e-05*** (1.70e-05)	4.90e-05*** (1.65e-05)	7.97e-05 (5.96e-05)
Farm Value 1860	-8.79e-05 (0.000622)	0.000414 (0.000559)	-0.000873 (0.00108)
% Free Black Pop. 1860	11.34*** (2.825)	8.773*** (2.483)	13.53* (7.810)
% Enslaved Pop. 1860	4.389*** (0.440)	3.504*** (0.564)	5.889*** (1.435)
Cotton suitability 1860	0.599 (0.657)	0.741 (0.810)	1.289 (0.857)
Rail Access	0.644*** (0.186)	0.740*** (0.176)	0.626* (0.320)
Water Access	0.399*** (0.154)	0.318** (0.136)	0.293 (0.227)
Confederate Battle Deaths	8.18e-06 (8.89e-05)	-3.35e-05 (9.88e-05)	2.86e-05 (0.000316)
Union Battle Deaths	-6.30e-05 (7.19e-05)	9.44e-06 (0.000167)	-8.80e-05 (0.000247)
Battles	0.143* (0.0801)	0.0888 (0.0807)	0.0775 (0.140)
lnalpha	0.274 (0.204)		
Constant	-5.125*** (0.801)	-3.710*** (0.537)	
Observations	1,295	1,295	1,018
State FE	X	X	X

Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 1.4.1 re-estimates our main model while altering the functional form. Column 1 presents the results using negative binomial regression. Column 2 presents our results using a Poisson estimator. Column 3 uses a binary indicator of any Black official as the outcome measure with logistic regression. All models use state fixed effects and bootstrapped standard errors. Positive coefficients for our independent variables indicate support for our hypothesis.

1.5 Alternative Outcome Measures

As a further test of our argument, we use two alternative outcome measures instead of our primary outcome measure of *Black Elected Officials*. The first alternative outcome measure is *Black Delegates* to the state constitutional convention. After the Civil War, some territories in rebellion needed to pass new constitutions to be readmitted to the Union, requiring the election of delegates to these constitutional conventions. Because not all states in our sample were required to re-write their constitution, we only have delegate information for the states that were (Confederate states of: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia). Using data from Hume (2008) we identify and collect data on state constitutional delegates who were Black and use this as one alternative outcome measure.

The second alternative outcome measure is *Black Voter Registration (1867 to 1869)*. We also have voter registration by race for those states that had to rewrite their state constitutions. We use county-level voter registration information from Logan (2019). These data contain raw numbers of registered voters for Black and White voters by county for the time period between 1867 to 1869, and are based on data collected by Hume (2008). We take the number of Black registered voters and divide it by the total of White and Black registered voters to get the percent of voters that identify as Black, and we use this as another outcome measure. Appendix Table 1.5.1 presents the descriptive information about these two measures and compares them to our main outcome measure of *Black Elected Officials*. Importantly, both alternative outcome measures reduce our sample size considerably, which is why we do not report them in the main text.

Table 1.5.1: Summary of Alternative Outcome Measures

	Contraband Camp		No Camp		Difference	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	β	t
Black Elected Official	3.62	7.47	0.83	2.57	-2.79***	(-3.68)
Black Delegates	0.51	1.01	0.16	0.53	-0.35***	(-3.41)
% Black Voter Registration	59.96	22.40	40.42	23.02	-19.54***	(-6.30)
Observations	98		1197		1295	

We then re-estimate our main matching and OLS results but replace the outcome measure of *Black Elected Officials* with a measure for *Black Delegates* (columns 3 and 4 of Appendix Table 1.5.2) and *Black Voter Registration* (columns 5 and 6 of Appendix Table 1.5.2). As a point of reference, in Appendix Table 1.5.2, columns 1 and 2 present the baseline results found in the main text. Overall, while there were a smaller number of Black delegates, our matching estimates indicate that counties that had a contraband camp had on average 0.581 Black delegates compared to 0.162 in matched counties without a contraband camp. This is a 0.419 difference, over a 100% increase relative to untreated counties, and is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The effect, however, is smaller for our OLS results. In terms of the percent of Black men who were registered to vote, counties that had a contraband camp had 4.657 percentage points more Black men registered to vote than counties that did not have a camp according to our matching estimates, and about 3 percentage points more Black men registered to vote according to our OLS estimates. This difference is statistically significant in our OLS estimates. In total, although these measures reduce our sample size considerably, our results remain consistent with expectations.

Table 1.5.2: Alternative Outcome Measures


	(1) Main Results (Matching)	(2) Main Results (OLS)	(3) Black Delegates (Matching)	(4) Black Delegates (OLS)	(5) Black Voter Reg. (Matching)	(6) Black Voter Reg. (OLS)
Contraband Camp	2*** (0.707)	1.463*** (0.562)	0.419*** (0.113)	0.187 (0.145)	4.657 (3.129)	2.896** (1.286)
Land inequality 1860		0.319 (1.071)		0.312 (0.276)		12.06** (4.836)
Population 1860		2.55e-05 (1.74e-05)		2.70e-05** (1.28e-05)		0.000327*** (9.47e-05)
Farm Value 1860		-0.000472 (0.00146)		-0.000514** (0.000202)		4.40e-05 (0.00482)
% Free Black Pop. 1860		9.144 (7.555)		1.057 (2.742)		85.15*** (21.43)
% Enslaved Pop. 1860		4.218*** (0.925)		0.722*** (0.266)		97.04*** (3.995)
Cotton suitability 1860		-2.126*** (0.681)		-0.254 (0.288)		3.278 (5.376)
Rail Access		0.677** (0.311)		0.116** (0.0552)		1.056 (1.183)
Water Access		0.436* (0.235)		0.0471 (0.0554)		3.175** (1.245)
Confederate Battle Deaths		-0.000337 (0.000404)		-4.45e-05 (3.97e-05)		0.000662 (0.000485)
Union Battle Deaths		8.30e-05 (0.000347)		2.49e-05 (3.97e-05)		-0.000665 (0.000632)
Battles		1.053 (0.775)		0.000246 (0.0461)		0.416 (0.728)
Constant		-0.319 (0.436)		-0.255 (0.210)		-7.417*** (2.284)
Observations	1,264	1,295	847	847	699	699
R-squared		0.215		0.180		0.844
States		16		10		10
State FE		X		X		X

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 1.5.2 compares our main results using Black Elected Officials as our outcome with two alternative measures: Black Delegates to state constitutional conventions (columns 3 and 4) and Black Voter Registration (columns 4 and 5). Across all columns, our key independent variable is the presence of a contraband camp in a county. Columns 1, 3, and 5 presents our results from matching with mahalanobis distances. Columns 2, 4 and 6 use OLS regression with state fixed effects and bootstrapped standard errors. Positive coefficients for our independent variables indicate support for our hypothesis.

Figure 1.5.1: Alternative Outcome Measures



References

Hume, Jerry B, Richard L Gough. *Blacks, carpetbaggers, scalawags: The constitutional conventions of radical reconstruction*. LSU Press, 2008.


Logan, Trevon. *Do Black Politicians Matter? Evidence from Reconstruction [Dataset]*, 2019. Doi = <https://doi.org/10.3886/E115861V1> <https://doi.org/10.3886/E115861V1>.

1.6 Accounting for Migration and Changing Demographics

The upheaval of the Civil War and Reconstruction contributed to migration and some degree of demographic change around the country. Such migration and demographic change could pose problems for our estimates in a number of ways which we address to the greatest extent possible here. Notably, we only have population data from the 1860 and 1870 census, so we lack data on where most individuals moved from and to both during the Civil War and during Reconstruction. Additionally, there is considerable missingness in 1870 Black population data. Historians have documented that both the missingness and quality of the data are problematic for an analysis of this period (Reid 1995; Steckel 1991). Despite these limitations, we conduct several tests to account for the influence of migration on our results.

First, we are particularly attentive to the fact that the larger the proportion of the population who was Black, the easier it might be to elect a Black officeholder (Fraga 2016), especially if the Black population of a county was greater than 50%. We consider whether there are any discontinuities driven by a county being majority Black by population size in 1860 (Appendix Figure 1.6.1). Appendix Figure 1.6.1 demonstrates that while more Black elected officials emerged as the Black population in a county increased, there do not appear to be any discontinuities at the 50% threshold. This trend is consistent in both treated and untreated counties. As an additional test, we re-estimate our main results but include an indicator for whether a county was majority Black or not. Our results are presented in Appendix Table 1.6.1. While majority Black counties are associated with more Black elected officials, our results nevertheless remain of similar magnitude and statistical significance.

Figure 1.6.1: Black Population Size and Elected Officials, By Camp Presence



Next, we explore population shifts in counties that had a contraband camp and those that did not. Appendix Figure 1.6.2 presents the change in a county's Black population size from 1860 to 1870. Among both treated and untreated counties, we observe increases and decreases in Black population size. Likewise, Appendix Figure 1.6.3 demonstrates that both untreated and treated counties experienced increases and decreases in the Black population size. While both treated and untreated counties experienced negative and positive shifts in the Black population size, we might be particularly concerned with urban counties. Some contraband camps were located in and around urban centers. At the same time, Black persons could move from plantations to cities seeking better opportunities. Such a process would make it appear as if contraband camps caused an increase in Black officeholding, when in fact it was due to city locations. To account for this possibility, we exclude major urban centers and re-estimate our main results but exclude counties at or above the 95th percentile of population size in 1860. When removing these counties, our results remain robust (Appendix Table 1.6.2).

Table 1.6.1: Majority Black Counties

	(1) Matching	(2) OLS
Camps	2.378*** (0.707)	1.574*** (0.565)
Majority Black County 1860		1.468*** (0.511)
Land inequality 1860		0.847 (1.274)
Population 1860		2.55e-05 (1.70e-05)
Farm Value 1860		-0.000112 (0.000127)
% Free Black Pop. 1860		7.175 (7.616)
% Enslaved Pop. 1860		1.630 (1.045)
Cotton suitability 1860		-1.673*** (0.647)
Rail Access		0.623** (0.305)
Water Access		0.426* (0.236)
Confederate Battle Deaths		-0.000349 (0.000416)
Union Battle Deaths		8.39e-05 (0.000350)
Battles		1.039 (0.766)
Constant		-0.391 (0.500)
Observations	1,264	1,295
R-squared		0.229
Number of States		16
State FE		X

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 1.6.1 re-estimates our main matching and OLS models with our main outcome measure of Black Elected Officials but includes an additional measure as a robustness check: whether a county is a majority Black county. Across all columns, our key independent variable is the presence of a contraband camp in a county. Column 1 presents our results from matching with mahalanobis distances. Column 2 uses OLS regression with state fixed effects and bootstrapped standard errors. Positive coefficients for our independent variable indicate support for our hypothesis.

Next, we assume that the influence of Black migration on our results is likely most problematic if the Black population size shifted above or below the 50% threshold: the level at which the Black population

Figure 1.6.2: Change in Population Size from 1860 to 1870





Figure 1.6.3: Histogram of Change in Population Size from 1860 to 1870



would constitute a voting majority, ostensibly able to determine elections. To account for this, in columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table 1.6.2, we exclude the counties with camps that became majority Black counties in 1870 but were not majority Black counties in 1860 (four total counties across three states). As a tougher test, because counties with contraband camps could be drawing in Black persons from neighboring counties, this would raise the probability of electing a Black official in treated counties but lower it in untreated neighbor counties. To account for this possibility, in columns 3 and 4 of Appendix Table 1.6.2, we exclude both treated counties that became majority Black in 1870 but were not in 1860, as well as neighboring counties that were majority Black in 1860 but were not in 1870 (four treated and fifteen neighbor counties). Results remain robust in most models.

Finally, it is possible that Black men with political ambitions moved to counties where Black men were already being elected to office at higher rates. These counties could produce an overwhelming number of Black officeholders in ways that over-inflate estimates. To account for this possibility, in columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table 1.6.4, we re-estimate our analysis but exclude the counties that elected more than 40 officials (two counties). In columns 3 and 4 of Appendix Table 1.6.4, we re-estimate our analysis but exclude the counties that elected more than 20 officials (four counties). Results remain robust.

Table 1.6.2: Removing Most Populous Counties

	(1) Matching	(2) OLS
Camps	1.321** (0.553)	1.147*** (0.416)
Land inequality 1860		0.0627 (0.934)
Population 1860		7.48e-05** (3.79e-05)
Farm Value 1860		0.000139 (0.00135)
% Free Black Pop. 1860		6.217 (6.023)
% Enslaved Pop. 1860		3.325*** (0.941)
Cotton suitability 1860		-1.620** (0.734)
Confederate Battle Deaths		-4.27e-05 (0.000256)
Union Battle Deaths		-6.29e-06 (0.000318)
Rail Access		0.496* (0.263)
Water Access		0.354 (0.253)
Battles		0.319 (0.458)
Constant		-0.467 (0.409)
Observations	1,201	1,214
R-squared		0.167
Number of States		16
State FE		X

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 1.6.2 re-estimates our main matching and OLS models with our main outcome measure of Black Elected Officials but excludes counties that are in the 95th percentile of population. Across all columns, our key independent variable is the presence of a contraband camp in a county. Column 1 presents our results from matching with mahalanobis distances. Column 2 presents the results of OLS regression with state fixed effects and bootstrapped standard errors. Positive coefficients for our independent variables indicate support for our hypothesis.

Table 1.6.3: Accounting for Migration

	(1) Exclude In-Migration Treatment Counties (Matching)	(2) Exclude In-Migration Treatment Counties (OLS)	(3) Exclude Out-Migration Neighbor Counties (Matching)	(4) Exclude Out-Migration Neighbor Counties (OLS)
Camps	2.213** (0.863)	1.378** (0.641)	2.170*** (0.730)	1.314 (0.868)
Land inequality 1860		0.213 (0.861)		0.266 (0.763)
Population 1860		2.58e-05 (2.64e-05)		2.50e-05 (3.08e-05)
Farm Value 1860		-0.000422 (0.00121)		-0.000206 (0.00124)
% Free Black Pop. 1860		8.490 (9.659)		8.669 (7.422)
% Enslaved Pop. 1860		4.215*** (1.080)		4.194*** (0.784)
Cotton suitability 1860		-2.144*** (0.814)		-2.148** (0.912)
Rail Access		0.691* (0.380)		0.699* (0.378)
Water Access		0.431** (0.207)		0.430** (0.195)
Confederate Battle Deaths		-0.000326 (0.000423)		-0.000276 (0.000505)
Union Battle Deaths		7.93e-05 (0.000268)		-6.73e-05 (0.000407)
Battles		1.034 (0.780)		1.169 (0.870)
Constant		-0.265 (0.438)		-0.308 (0.572)
Observations	1,260	1,291	1,245	1,276
R-squared		0.209		0.216
Number of States		16		16
State FE		X		X

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 1.6.3 attempts to account for Civil War- and Reconstruction-era migration between counties. In columns 1 and 2, we re-estimate our main matching and OLS models with our main outcome measure of Black Elected Officials but exclude treated counties that became majority Black counties in 1870 (4 counties). In columns 3 and 4, we re-estimate our main matching and OLS models with our main outcome measure of Black Elected Officials but exclude treated counties that became majority Black counties in 1870 (4 counties) and neighboring counties that were Black majority counties in 1860 but were not in 1870 (15 counties). Across all columns, our key independent variable is the presence of a contraband camp in a county. Columns 1 and 3 presents our results from matching with mahalanobis distances. Columns 2 and 4 use OLS regression with state fixed effects and bootstrapped standard errors. Positive coefficients for our independent variables indicate support for our hypothesis.

Table 1.6.4: Excluding Counties with the Most Black Elected Officials

	(1) Exclude 40+ Official Counties (Matching)	(2) Exclude 40+ Official Counties (OLS)	(3) Exclude 20+ Official Counties (Matching)	(4) Exclude 20+ Official Counties (OLS)
Camps	1.505** (0.597)	1.139** (0.479)	1.344*** (0.520)	1.154** (0.543)
Land inequality 1860		0.217 (0.843)		-0.0869 (0.953)
Population 1860		2.65e-05 (2.57e-05)		2.63e-05 (2.23e-05)
Farm Value 1860		2.40e-05 (0.00141)		0.000621 (0.00118)
% Free Black Pop. 1860		8.300 (5.315)		7.560 (5.066)
% Enslaved Pop. 1860		4.092*** (0.920)		3.881*** (0.985)
Cotton suitability 1860		-1.794** (0.699)		-1.483*** (0.547)
Rail Access		0.711** (0.336)		0.491* (0.258)
Water Access		0.410* (0.216)		0.260 (0.197)
Confederate Battle Deaths		-2.07e-05 (0.000399)		-2.68e-05 (0.000150)
Union Battle Deaths		-4.08e-05 (0.000413)		-3.83e-05 (0.000114)
Battles		0.456 (0.301)		0.304 (0.193)
Constant		-0.398 (0.396)		-0.335 (0.419)
Observations	1,263	1,294	1,260	1,291
R-squared		0.182		0.194
Number of States		16		16
State FE		X		X

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 1.6.4 re-estimates our main matching and OLS models with our main outcome measure of Black Elected Officials but excludes counties with over 40 Black elected officials (2 total counties, columns 1 and 2) and excludes counties with over 20 Black elected officials (4 counties, columns 3 and 4). Across all columns, our key independent variable is the presence of a contraband camp in a county. Columns 1 and 3 present our results from matching with mahalanobis distances. Columns 2 and 4 use OLS regression with state fixed effects and bootstrapped standard errors. Positive coefficients for our independent variables indicate support for our hypothesis.

References

- Fraga, Bernard L. "Candidates or districts? Reevaluating the role of race in voter turnout." *American Journal of Political Science* 60.1 (2016): 97–122.
- Reid, Richard. "The 1870 United States census and black underenumeration: A test case from North Carolina." *Histoire sociale/Social History* .
- Steckel, Richard H. "The quality of census data for historical inquiry: A research agenda." *Social Science History* 15.4 (1991): 579–599.

1.7 Antebellum Religious Institutions

As a robustness check, we consider whether religious institutions in a particular location held consistent anti-enslavement policies prior to the Civil War (measured in 1860). Because religious institutions were often informal community organizers, by accounting for pre-Civil War anti-slavery religious institutions, we address social influences that might predispose particular locations to be more supportive of Union efforts to build contraband camps and also more supportive of post-war officeholding by Black men. In other words, locations with antebellum religious institutions that consistently supported and enforced anti-enslavement policies among members might be more inclined to support Union efforts thereby facilitating the presence of contraband camps, while simultaneously being more willing to support post-war Black officeholders.

To ascertain whether a religious institution was anti-enslavement, that institution had to have universal guidance to all houses of worship and congregants that enslavement was prohibited or punished, and virtually all adherents of the religion did not partake in enslaving. This consistent universality on the issue of anti-enslavement is important: in many cases, certain sects produced abolitionist individuals, but such stances were *individual* and not *institutional*. Because they were not *institutional*, regional variation in anti-enslavement sentiments and behaviors emerged. In instances where *institutional* positions with respect to enslaving were ambiguous or unenforced, we did not code the religious institution as being anti-enslavement. Justifications for coding decisions are available upon request.

We account for the presence of an anti-enslavement religious institution by creating a count of the number of *Anti-Slavery Religious Institutions* institutions in a county, indicating the number of religious institutions that met the aforementioned criteria in a county in 1860. We also create a binary measure of *Anti-Slavery Religious Institutions (Binary)* if there was any anti-enslavement religious institution (taking on a value of ‘1’), or not in a county (taking a value of ‘0’).

We then replicated our main matching and OLS models (columns 1 and 2, of Table 1.7.1) with the addition of both *Anti-Slavery Religious Institutions* variables in separate models. We present these results in Appendix Table 1.7.1. Our results are robust and indicate that contraband camps still have a positive and statistically significant effect on Reconstruction-era Black officeholding when accounting for the influence of pre-treatment social and political factors that could affect the placement of camps as well as Black officeholding.

Table 1.7.1: Antebellum Religious Institutions

	(1) Matching	(2) OLS	(3) Matching	(4) OLS
Camps	2.061*** (0.740)	1.471*** (0.561)	2.459*** (0.764)	1.464*** (0.564)
Anti-Slavery Inst.		-0.0410 (0.0346)		
Anti-Slavery Inst. (Binary)				-0.0655 (0.239)
Land inequality 1860		0.312 (1.091)		0.313 (1.095)
Population 1860		2.73e-05 (1.87e-05)		2.58e-05 (1.84e-05)
Farm Value 1860		-0.000366 (0.00145)		-0.000440 (0.00148)
% Free Black Pop. 1860		8.822 (7.559)		9.062 (7.642)
% Enslaved Pop. 1860		4.150*** (0.907)		4.212*** (0.944)
Cotton suitability 1860		-2.080*** (0.688)		-2.109*** (0.714)
Rail Access		0.675** (0.311)		0.680** (0.315)
Water Access		0.438* (0.236)		0.437* (0.234)
Confederate Battle Deaths		-0.000340 (0.000404)		-0.000337 (0.000408)
Union Battle Deaths		8.32e-05 (0.000348)		8.25e-05 (0.000351)
Battle		1.060 (0.775)		1.055 (0.778)
Constant		-0.322 (0.442)		-0.310 (0.429)
Observations	1,264	1,295	1,264	1,295
R-squared		0.216		0.215
Number of States		16		16
State FE		X		X

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 1.7.1 re-estimates our main matching and OLS models with our main outcome measure of Black Elected Officials but includes two additional measures as a robustness check: the count of anti-slavery churches in a county (columns 1 and 2) and a binary measure for any anti-slavery churches in a county (columns 3 and 4). Across all columns, our key independent variable is the presence of a contraband camp in a county. Columns 1 and 3 present our results from matching with mahalanobis distances. Columns 2 and 4 use OLS regression with state fixed effects and bootstrapped standard errors. Positive coefficients for our independent variables indicate support for our hypothesis.

1.8 Qualitative Evidence of Mechanisms

We use our quantitative analysis to identify a causal link between contraband camps and Black officeholders. We turn to secondary and primary source qualitative materials, some of which were collected from the Library of Virginia and the South Carolina Archives, as well as digitally from the Harvard Houghton Library, to probe whether our mechanisms operate as expected.

Before we begin, however, it is worth discussing the nature of these sources and the biases they might produce. Because the education of enslaved persons was prohibited in almost all enslaving states but Kentucky and Maryland (Davis 2011, 106), formerly enslaved persons who lived in contraband camps often lacked any formal education and were illiterate (Douglass Monthly 1861, 564, 566). Formerly enslaved persons gained an education as adults. Given their late education, Miller (1995, 49) explains that late-educated, former enslaved political leaders such as Representative Robert Smalls did not draft as much written legislation and “kept a low profile, deferr[ing] during debates to the more educated if not more articulate blacks and whites who dominated the proceedings.” If this reflects a general pattern of hesitancy toward (public) writing as a result of late education due to conditions of bondage, even among the most successful Black leaders at this time, it is perhaps unsurprising that written documents of formerly enslaved persons living in what was then contraband camps are difficult to obtain. Indeed, historians writing on contraband camps also note the same problem and often rely on sources primarily written by White persons (Walker 1974, 5). As a result, the bulk of our primary materials comes from two sources: reports from predominantly White military and government officials and newspapers. The former are paternalistic. The latter vary in their outlook depending upon the ideological orientation of the publisher, but even Black-run abolitionist papers are not free of biases related to class differences between enslaved persons and the writers and editors of these papers. Furthermore, where contraband camps might have limited White persons’ ability to block political officeholding by Black men, women were explicitly excluded from the social infrastructure of officeholding, and their contributions to this infrastructure might be overlooked in these data. Indeed, most of the primary materials written by women involve White women from charitable organizations who volunteered as teachers or nurses in contraband camps. Of course, this does not mean that both Black and White women did not play an active role in local political engagement, but rather, this is unlikely to be captured in primary materials. Our interpretation of these materials is conducted with this context in mind.

Our theory relies on mechanisms operating at two levels: the individual level and the community level. In terms of individual-level mechanisms, we argue that camps facilitated the acquisition of skills and experiences that were convertible to post-war officeholding while providing individuals connections with resource-rich external networks through the camps or military. In terms of the community level, camps facilitated the creation of local-level political networks that mobilized and expanded the franchise, at least until voter disenfranchisement and violence by White persons became so intense that it was virtually impossible for Black men to hold political office. We investigate these mechanisms in turn.

Camps and Leader-Level Factors that Facilitated Officeholding by Black Men

Contraband camps provided opportunities for Black men to engage in community organization and leadership. According to reports from superintendents of contraband camps, “a system has been adopted for their government, in which they [formerly enslaved persons] take a considerable and pleasing part” (Warren 1865, 12). Within this system, a sheriff and a judge were “appointed from among the more reliable and intelligent men” (Warren 1865, 12). In a camp in Corinth, Mississippi, “freedpeople established schools, a system of political wards, a self-governing police force, and the Union Christian Church of Corinth” (Manning 2017). In Davis Bend, Mississippi, the Union Army established a contraband camp with a judicial system in which judges were elected (Hermann 1999, 62-4). Some Black men who were free before the war took on camp leadership roles that were not explicitly political but could become politicized, such as ministers or teachers, and these same men later held elected office (Foner 1993, 37-8; 105-6). Evidence also suggests that individu-

als from contraband camps carried their convertible organizational skills elsewhere if they left once-treated counties. For instance, the all-Black town of Mound Bayou was founded by 12 people who lived together on the contraband camp at Davis Bend (Ruffin 2007) and in Mound Bayou, some of the founders from Davis Bend held elected positions (Ruffin 2007). Camps had clear precursor-to-office positions that provided an electoral boost after war.

Beyond camp administrative positions, the Army recruited some of its first Black troops from contraband camps. According to newspapers from the time, “The recruiting for the First District of Columbia colored volunteers goes on daily under the auspices of the white aspirants for office in the regiment. They have now, perhaps, one hundred fifty names enrolled whom they are drilling mornings and afternoons at the contraband camp in Washington” (Alexandria Gazette 1863). From the outset, the idea of Black military service was tightly linked with citizenship and political engagement, and Black leaders like Frederick Douglass spread these ideas through a network of activists and sympathetic newspapers (Douglass 1863). Indeed, Masur (2010, 11) explains that “[B]lack soldiers, once enlisted, pressed for unprecedented rights and privileges.” They “rejected conventions of racial deference and demanded, instead, to be respected on the streets and to ride the city’s newly established streetcars as equals to white men. By the summer, African Americans were insisting ... that freedom must mean full citizenship” (Masur 2010, 15). In Beaufort, South Carolina, the location of a contraband camp, a regiment led by Black officers was organized, and these officers advocated strongly to Brigadier General Lorenzo Thomas for fair pay (Berlin, Hahn, Glymph, Reidy, Hayden, Miller, Rowland, and Saville 1993a, 388). Unlike other former Black persons at the time, Black soldiers called for and sometimes received an education in their positions (Berlin et al. 1993a, 615-8), rendering them better educated than many persons without military experiences. Thus, Black soldiers were drawn from contraband camps and became politicized authorities, helping propel some Black soldiers to post-war office positions (Foner 1993).

In addition to holding leadership positions within camps or through military recruitment vis-a-vis camps, individuals often liaised with higher-ranked government or military officials, as well as individuals from political networks. Such interactions laid the foundation for subsequent resources and support for post-war officeholding. For instance, in 1867, the assistant commissioner for Virginia’s Freedmen’s Bureau, Orlando Brown, “ordered every bureau officer in the state to provide headquarters with ‘the names of six of the most intelligent of the freedmen belonging to each county, in whom both races have confidence’” (Lowe 1995, 183). Lowe (1995, 183) suggests that the purpose of this list was to identify individuals who might be able to hold political office. One such individual was William R. Davis of Elizabeth City County. Davis “was one of the very first ‘contrabands’ to gather at Union-held Fort Monroe early in the war. He soon took a job as ‘dispenser of rations’ [a camp administrative role] to other refugees who huddled in the shadow of the fort. Within a few weeks, he accompanied white northerners on a speaking tour of the northern states to raise money for the American Missionary Association [another external support network], money to be used for relief of other contrabands” (Lowe 1995, 192). The Union League in Stevenson, Jackson County (Alabama), the location of a contraband camp, recommended Union League member Samuel Carter for a position registering Black voters in that county (Bailey 2010, 43). In Marshall County, Mississippi, the location of a contraband camp, former enslaved person George Albright was a member of President Lincoln’s Loyal League, a secret society of enslaved persons who shared information and word of Emancipation (Foner 1993, 2). Albright was later elected to be a state senator for that county. Finally, Black soldiers in the Union Army often became close and supportive of one another, creating networks of veterans locally and beyond (Costa and Kahn 2006).

Camps and Community-Level Factors that Facilitated Officeholding by Black Men

In addition to corresponding with external networks, Black persons working or living in and around the contraband camps also formed political systems that facilitated community-level mobilization. Within these systems, certain individuals were recognized as authorities or leaders, while others in the systems supported them. Camps themselves became foci for political mobilization and consciousness-raising prior to the end of the Civil War (Dougherty 2014, 127-8; Hahn 2005, 78). In places like Beaufort, South Carolina, where a

contraband camp was (Cooper 2014), politicized community leaders would encourage and support Robert Smalls to run for elected office (Miller 1995, 44-5). During the Civil War, David Young took on a campaign for Black suffrage, and he would go on to be elected for office in Concordia, Louisiana, the location of a contraband camp (Foner 1993, 237). Similarly, the owners of Ashpoo plantation, located in the same county as a contraband camp, complained that the Black workers had organized and refused to work for pay below a certain amount. This coordinated action and the prospect of lost profits caused so much consternation among the White plantation owners that they wrote furiously to the Reconstruction Governor of South Carolina for help (Hayworth 1868). These examples demonstrate concerted efforts to politicize and mobilize camp residents.

Black soldiers also exercised considerable authority (Berlin, Hahn, Glymph, Reidy, Hayden, Miller, Rowland, and Saville 1993b, 353-4). Black soldiers encouraged formerly enslaved persons to demand fair treatment and compensation for their work, going so far as to physically threaten White plantation owners who had hired formerly enslaved persons but failed to abide by their contracts (Berlin et al. 1993b, 353-4). Black soldiers also politicized others around them, spreading news about freedom and political rights of formerly enslaved persons (Berlin et al. 1993a). These efforts created geographical, between-county variation in the social infrastructure of officeholding between counties.

Other efforts by Black persons in contraband camps contributed to geographic, between-county variation in the social infrastructure of officeholding. One way to expand officeholding was to serve as role models or aspirations for other Black men to hold political office later. As an example, in Beaufort, South Carolina, as a customs officer much later in life, Rep. Smalls wrote to Booker T. Washington in 1913. In the letter, Smalls writes that “when the excellent history of the Tuskegee and the Negro shall be written, the Customs House at Beaufort, while conducted by colored men, can be easily attached to the top or bottom, for whatever inspiration it may be to the Race” (Foner 2003). Smalls actively sought to inculcate the idea of future Black men holding office.

Other common approaches to expanding officeholding locally included creating party machines or connecting local, communal institutions with political networks. Both machines or institutionalized civil systems facilitated the recruitment of individuals for political office while also mobilizing support for officeholders. In Beaufort, South Carolina, Small and others helped build a party machine to perpetuate political, economic and social gains made during Reconstruction (Uya 1971, 57-8). The Beaufort party gang would not be the only one to emerge in counties with contraband camps: in Vicksburg, a group of Black men formed a political machine called the “Vicksburg Ring” (Foner 1993, 54). In Concordia, Louisiana, David Young headed a Republican political party machine (Foner 1993, 237). In Davis Bend, Benjamin Montgomery crafted a political apparatus around his family that saw his son William hold political office (Foner 1993, 151-2), while also inspiring rival Black political machines in the same county and similarly emerging from the contraband camp on Davis Bend (Foner 1993, 26).

In other counties with contraband camps, although explicit party machines did not emerge, political networks fused with local institutions in ways that preserved and encouraged Black men to seek political office. For instance, in Arlington, Virginia where a contraband camp was located, Black churches and civil organizations became increasingly political and took active stances on important political issues of the time (Bestebreurtje 2017, 179-180). What resulted is that the “first generation of African Americans . . . grew up in freedom and came of age during the Reconstruction era when social and political rights were still relatively strong for African Americans. Men like Edmund C. Fleet, Sr. who were born in the [contraband camp], educated there, and had not personally experienced the trials of slavery, used the community institutions, education, and sense of community imparted to them by their parents to push for more rights through active membership in Arlington’s middle class institutions” (Bestebreurtje 2017, 100). Bestebreurtje (2018, 350) writes that:

“Local whites claimed that ‘the presence of the Negroes on the reservation [the contraband camp] has a peculiar effect on politics’ and that African Americans ‘controlled the county, electing their Board of Supervisors.’ . . . Because of all these political changes, some African Americans were

elected to county positions. This was especially true within Jefferson District, which contained [a contraband camp]. Community leader and blacksmith William A. Rowe became a particularly successful black politician. He served as supervisor of Jefferson District from 1871 to 1879, even serving as board chairman from 1872 to 1883.”

It is also no surprise that in 1931, at the height of Jim Crow restrictions on Black political rights and civic activism, Black candidates continued to run for office (albeit unsuccessfully) in the former location of a contraband camp in Arlington. These candidates were often born and raised in Arlington, specifically within the neighborhoods created by contraband camp residents (Bestebreurtje 2017, 215). One candidate, George Vollin, Jr., was a lifelong Arlington county resident whose parents had lived in the main “contraband” camp in Arlington (called Freedmen’s Village) (Bestebreurtje 2017, 215) and grew up in a neighborhood that had its origins in the Freedmen’s Village (Bestebreurtje 2017, 97).

References

- Alexandria Gazette. “Army Movements.” 1863. Alexandria gazette. [volume] (Alexria, D.C.), 08 May 1863. *Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers*. Lib. of Congress. <https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85025007/1863-05-08/ed-1/seq-4/>.
- Bailey, Richard. *Neither carpetbaggers nor scalawags: Black officeholders during the Reconstruction of Alabama, 1867-1878*. NewSouth Books, 2010.
- Berlin, Ira, Hahn, Steven, Glymph, Thavolia, Reidy, Joseph P, Hayden, René, Miller, Steven F, Rowland, Leslie S, and Saville, Julie. *Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867. Series 2: The Black Military Experience*. Cambridge University Press, 1993a.
- . *Freedom: Volume 3, Series 1: The Wartime Genesis of Free Labor: The Lower South: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867*. Cambridge University Press, 1993b.
- Bestebreurtje, Lindsey. *Built By The People Themselves: African American Community Development in Arlington, Virginia, From Civil War Through Civil Rights*. Ph.D. thesis, 2017.
- . “Beyond the Plantation: Freedmen, Social Experimentation, African American Community Development in Freedman’s Village, 1863–1900.” *The Virginia Magazine of History Biography* 126.3 (2018): 334–365.
- Cooper, Abigail. *Interactive Map of Contraband Camps*, 2014. History Digital Projects https://repository.upenn.edu/hist_digital/1.
- Costa, Dora L and Kahn, Matthew E. “Forging a new identity: the costs and benefits of diversity in Civil War combat units for black slaves and freemen.” *The Journal of Economic History* 66.4 (2006): 936–962.
- Davis, Angela Y. *Women, race, & class*. Vintage, 2011.
- Dougherty, Kevin. *The Port Royal Experiment: A Case Study in Development*. Univ. Press of MS, 2014.
- Douglass, Frederick. “Speech of Frederick Douglass.” 1863. Accessed 5 April 2021 via ProQuest at <https://blackfreedom.proquest.com/speech-of-frederick-douglass-2/>.
- Douglass Monthly. “Dealings with Slavery and the Contrabands.” 1861. Douglass Monthly. Downloaded from the *American Historical Newspaper* dataset via Proquest on 24 March 2021. Original article published December 1861.

- Foner, Eric. "Biographical Sidebar: Robert Smalls." 2003. Accessed 5 April 2021 at https://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/exhibits/reconstruction/section4/section4_smalls.html.
- Foner, Eric others. *Freedom's Lawmakers: A Directory of Black Officeholders during Reconstruction*. Oxford University Press, USA, 1993.
- Hahn, Steven. *A nation under our feet: Black political struggles in the rural south from slavery to the great migration*. Harvard University Press, 2005.
- Hayworth, Albert. "Letter from Albert Hayworth to Governor R. Scott." 1868.
- Hermann, Janet Sharp. *The pursuit of a dream*. Univ. Press of Mississippi, 1999.
- Lowe, Richard. "Local black leaders during Reconstruction in Virginia." *The Virginia Magazine of History Biography* 103.2 (1995): 181–206.
- Manning, Chandra. "Contraband Camps and the African American Refugee Experience during the Civil War." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of American History*. 2017.
- Masur, Kate. *An Example for All the L: Emancipation the Struggle over Equality in Washington, DC*. Univ of North Carolina Press, 2010.
- Miller, Edward A. *Gullah Statesman: Robert Smalls from Slavery to Congress, 1839-1915*. University of South Carolina Press, 1995.
- Ruffin, Herbert. "Mound Bayou (1887-)." 2007. Published through Black Past on 18 January 2007 . Accessed 8 April 2021 <https://www.blackpast.org/african-american-history/mound-bayou-1887/>.
- Uya, Okon Edet. *From Slavery to Public Service: Robert Smalls, 1839-1915*. Oxford University Press, 1971.
- Walker, Cam. "Corinth: The Story of a Contrab Camp." *Civil War History* 20.1 (1974): 5–22.
- Warren, Joseph. "Colored Schools." *Reports Relating to Colored Schools in Mississippi, Arkansas Western Tennessee*. ed. Joseph Warren. Memphis, TN: Freedmen Press Print, 1865. Accessed 5 April 2021. https://www.google.com/books/edition/_/SA0_AAAAYAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1.

1.9 Additional Data on Black Elected Officials

We relied on state archives to identify Black elected officials for the states not included in the Logan (2019) data set. We tried to identify the first elected Black officials in each state. If they were elected after the end of Reconstruction, we stopped our search. If they were elected before the end, we tried to identify any other Black elected official.

For Illinois, we identified two elected officials during Reconstruction time-frame. John Jones was the first Black person to be elected a Cook County Commissioner in 1871 (and reelected in 1872 to a three year term) (Morris 1970, 108). and W.C. Phillips was a delegate to the Republican County Convention. John W.E. Thomas was the first Black person to be elected to the Illinois General Assembly on November 7, 1876 (Joens 2001).

References

- Joens, David A. "John WE Thomas the Election of the First African American to the Illinois General Assembly." *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society (1998-)* 94.2 (2001): 200–216.

Logan, Trevon. *Do Black Politicians Matter? Evidence from Reconstruction [Dataset]*, 2019. Doi = <https://doi.org/10.3886/E115861V1> <https://doi.org/10.3886/E115861V1>.

Morris, Earl W others. "The Role and Contributions of American Negroes in the History of the United States of Illinois. A Guide for Teachers Curriculum Planners. Grades K through 12." 1970. <http://www.idaillinois.org/iiif/info/isl/14617/manifest.json>.