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*Governing for Revolution:  
Statebuilding during State Breakdown*

Megan A. Stewart, Ph.D.  
Assistant Professor  
School of International Service  
American University  
Tel:  
E-mail: mastew@american.edu

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# 1 Summary

*Governing for Revolution* illuminates and explains an important puzzle about rebel groups' governance behaviors in civil war. Existing research assumes that rebel governance is uniformly beneficial to rebels. But the reality is more complex. Some rebel governance projects are so costly in terms of time, finances and personnel, that rebels never recoup the resources they invest. Other forms of governance are militarily perilous: certain initiatives are controversial at best, but at worst are deeply unpopular, provoke sustained and violent resistance against rebels, or drive civilians into the ranks of rivals. To avoid these problems, some rebel groups limit their governance interventions by co-opting pre-existing sociopolitical organizations, enabling rebels to quickly and efficiently consolidate authority while minimizing resources spent doing so. But other rebel groups consciously and systematically execute intensive governance initiatives that are unpopular, financially burdensome and dangerous. This puzzling contrast raises the question: *Why do some rebel groups undertake costly, intensive governance projects that trigger resistance and violence, undermine their legitimacy, strengthen rival rebel groups, and even put their own combatants and civilians at risk, while other rebel groups do not?*

The case of Raqqa during the Syrian Civil War is an instructive contemporary example. After the protests of the Arab Spring descended into violence, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) quickly captured Raqqa in 2012, but left city administration to civilians. The FSA, an organization largely composed of defecting Syrian soldiers whose primary aim was to oust the Assad regime, was popular precisely because it limited its interference in civilian governance. In 2013, the Islamic State, a revolutionary jihadist group, seized Raqqa and expelled the FSA. Instead of relying on the FSA's popular strategy of delegated administration, IS implemented radical changes, developing comprehensive governing institutions and enforcing frequently unpopular policies that triggered violent and non-violent resistance against the group. By 2017, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by the revolutionary leftist Kurdish Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG), defeated IS and captured Raqqa. Like the Islamic State, the YPG implemented radical social and institutional change, and like the Islamic State, these radical policies were unpopular, viewed locally as a foreign occupation, and even sparked resistance against the rebel group.

Most research on rebel governance locates its importance in the debate about how rebel groups win domestic conflicts (Weinstein 2006; Mampilly 2011; Lidow 2016; Huang 2016; Arjona 2016). As governance interventions expand, the benefits to rebels from these projects—legitimacy, recruits, resources—are assumed to increase apace. This supposition, however, cannot explain rebel governance in places like Raqqa: the Free Syrian Army made the popular choice to limit its governance interventions, while the revolutionary YPG and Islamic State allocated considerable resources, time and personnel to first create, then enforce radical (albeit different) policies in the face of sustained and sometimes violent local opposition, thereby empowering rival rebels while channeling operatives and matériel away from the battlefield.

In *Governing for Revolution*, I argue that the nature of rebel groups' long-term goals determine whether governance will be relatively more intensive (like the YPG or Islamic State) or more limited (like the FSA). Rebel goals can be more or less transformative. Rebel organizations' with long-term goals that are more transformative endeavor to profoundly change the state, if not also society. Rebel groups with these transformative ambitions thus aspire to revolution. Other rebel organizations have less transformative, non-revolutionary goals, and instead aim to replace existing national leaders, to devolve power locally or to simply engage in war for personal enrichment.

Rebel groups with less transformative, non-revolutionary ambitions can accomplish most, if not all, of their long-term goals with a military victory or even a sustained military campaign that compels the state to negotiate a compromise. Whereas intensive governance frequently introduces unpopular policies that can undermine rebels' military capabilities and progress, limited governance interventions prioritize military success: rebel leaders co-opt pre-existing social, political and economic institutions without changing or rebuilding them, thereby reducing local resistance and minimizing expenses in governance. Rebel leaders can also limit access to certain goods and services, making them selective incentives for supporting or joining the rebel movement. Furthermore, rebel leaders with relatively less transformative ambitions are fully aware that they could prioritize and invest more in intensive governance projects, but they refuse to do so in order to foreground military success. Limited governance, in essence, is a balancing act: by limiting governance interventions, rebel leaders have less control over the nature of governance that emerges in their territorial strongholds. Yet, rebel groups are able to prioritize their military campaigns by preserving resources, targeting key bases of civilian support, and avoiding unpopular policies that could imperil both the rebel group and civilians. Because all rebel groups with less transformative goals need to succeed is military victory, they strategically limit their governance to accelerate, or at least not hinder, their military apparatus.

By contrast, rebels with comparably more transformative, revolutionary goals aim to fundamentally alter and reconstruct anew the state, if not also topple crystallized social, political and economic hierarchies. Although intensive governance projects facilitate the political and social change that rebels with more transformative goals need to realize their objectives, such schemes are also costly and dangerous. At the same time, rebel leaders with more transformative, revolutionary goals are aware that they could save widespread institutional transformation until after victory, prioritizing military success in the short term. Indeed, many of the best-known revolutions — the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution and the Iranian Revolution — are characterized by intensive governance *after* power has changed hands. But instead, revolutionary rebel leaders undertake intensive governance *during* war, intentionally making an expedient victory more elusive.

The reason why rebels with more transformative, revolutionary goals make the choice to undertake intensive governance *as rebels during civil war* dates back to Mao Tse-Tung's leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the Chinese Civil War. Mao pioneered an intensive governance strategy deployed alongside guerrilla warfare. The strategy of maximal governance consisted of a familiar portfolio of institutions—courts, schools, hospitals, political bodies, police, legal codes, land reform, market interventions. Together, this package of institutions composed the Chinese model of governance, and though pedestrian, the CCP designed and constructed these governance institutions to achieve radical and profound social and political change during war.

After victory, the successful Chinese rebel-group-turned-state immediately set about propagating its dual strategy of warmaking and statemaking as the correct and most legitimate model for achieving revolution during civil war. The CCP even created a formal training course to school would-be rebels in how to execute the Chinese model. These efforts triggered a cascade of rebel leaders adopting the Chinese model of governance—such as Ho Chi Minh, Amílcar Cabral, and Eduardo Mondlane—and set expectations amongst invested states and transnational activist networks about the “proper” method for rebels to realize their revolutionary ambitions. This global and historical context altered the decision-making calculus for rebel leaders with relatively more transformative, revolutionary goals.

Rebel leaders who endeavor to achieve revolution implement the Chinese model of governance during war for two reasons: one ideational and one strategic. First, revolution is a complex undertaking. For guidance, rebel leaders with revolutionary goals look to examples of other rebel groups that achieved shared ambitions in order to emulate their behaviors and strategies. Because of the CCP's propaganda campaigns and training courses, rebel leaders aspiring to revolution frequently encounter information about the CCP's experience, to include the Chinese model of governance. Even if rebel leaders with revolutionary goals do not study the CCP's experience exactly, they frequently find examples of previous rebel groups that learned from the Chinese model, emulated the CCP's governance, and achieved their transformative objectives. Given this knowledge, rebel leaders with revolutionary goals come to believe in both the necessity and appropriateness of implementing the Chinese model of governance during civil war. Second, by implementing the Chinese model of governance, rebel organizations conform to global expectations about the proper behavior for rebel groups aspiring to achieve revolutionary change. In so doing, rebel leaders with revolutionary goals believe that they can secure international legitimacy that can be leveraged for strategically critical political, economic and military support. Beliefs about the necessity and appropriateness of the Chinese model, as well as aspirations for essential international support, drive the adoption of the Chinese model of governance by rebels with revolutionary goals.

Despite incentives for rebels with more transformative, revolutionary goals to adopt the Chinese model, rebels that claim to aspire to these objectives may deviate from the Chinese model for three reasons. First, rebels might aspire to a moderate degree of transformation, but not the same degree of change the CCP sought and achieved. When rebels have more moderate goals, they implement certain aspects of the Chinese model, but not the Chinese model in its entirety. Second, rebels might claim to seek revolutionary goals for purely instrumental, and not normative reasons. These insincere commitments lead rebels to build weak if not Potemkin institutional components of the Chinese model of governance. Such institutions are cosmetic with little bearing locally, and intended for the consumption of outsiders. Third, rebels might be sincere in their commitments to great transformation, but might also face overwhelming strategic conditions—a rapidly crumbling state, the immediate end of the Cold War, foreign patronage or inappropriate structural conditions—that force rebels to abandon the Chinese model entirely.

Although certain conditions might cause rebels articulating with revolutionary ambitions to deviate from the Chinese model, ideology is not one of these reasons. Rebel perceptions' about the appropriateness of the Chinese model are not restricted to communist groups. Rather, it is a model for *all* rebels with more transformative, revolutionary goals. Though communist insurgencies may have been the predominant adopters of the Chinese model of governance during the Cold War, since the end of the Cold War, Islamist and jihadist rebel groups who also understand their goals as more transformative and revolutionary are increasingly likely to adopt the Chinese model, but adapt it to their ideology and local contexts. In so doing, jihadist revolutionaries are no different than the leftist revolutionary rebel groups that preceded them. Like Cold War revolutionaries, jihadist groups study successful rebel organizations with similar ambitions and attributes, then replicate these learned practices in their own conflicts. Al-Qaeda strategists, for instance, have specifically advocated for the implementation of the governance initiatives developed by Mao, claiming it is the appropriate way for rebels to achieve revolution, and today, al-Qaeda affiliates in places like Yemen and Syria developed or currently provide maximal and intensive governance. In Raqqa, for instance, the reason why both the YPG and the Islamic State pursued radical change through governance (albeit different in nature) is because they share similarly transformative goals and learned the

strategy of maximal and intensive governance during civil war from the same template: the model pioneered by Mao.

What emerges is a singular model of maximal and intensive governance to achieve profound social and political transformation, strategically deployed during civil war by rebels endeavoring to realize such goals, irrespective of space, time and ideology. Rebels with more transformative, revolutionary goals thus pursue both political and military objectives simultaneously such that victory in civil war is the culmination of a revolutionary process, as opposed to the antecedent step to radical social transformation.

To test this argument, I rely on a mixed-methods approach using data from archival research conducted at six archives in five countries, fieldwork in Lebanon, qualitative secondary sources and an original dataset. First, I provide a brief overview of the portfolio of governance institutions contained within the Chinese model of governance. In so doing, I am able to show in subsequent chapters that rebels' claims of emulating the Chinese model are not simply rhetorical, but that rebels carefully mimic the same institutional forms that the Chinese Communist Party built during its civil war, learned either through the study of the Chinese Civil War or from other rebel groups that adopted the Chinese model. Next, to demonstrate that rebel goals determine rebel governance strategies, and that rebels with more transformative, revolutionary goals consciously emulate the Chinese model, I present a set of highly similar cases: the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The three cases are virtually the same in all ways except their long-term goals, their commitment to these goals, and as predicted, their governance strategies. To then demonstrate that the Chinese model of intensive wartime governance is a model adopted by rebels with revolutionary goals across ideological categories, I use the case of the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), which was a non-communist and secessionist organization, and the case of Hezbollah from its origins until 2000, which was a revolutionary Islamist group. To contextualize these cases within broader trends and demonstrate generalizability across cases, I conduct a statistical analysis of an observable implication of my theory using an original dataset of rebel governance globally, from 1945 to 2003.

## 2 Contributions and Implications

*Governing for Revolution* makes two scholarly contributions: one to the field of civil wars and a second to the field of revolutions and state transformation. First, scholarship on civil wars has almost exclusively focused on violent aspects of rebel groups: rebel military tactics and strategies, the nature of violence, the targets of violence, the intensity of violence, the use of sexual violence, the relationship between organizational structures or recruitment processes and violence, *etc.* Even existing research on rebel governance has assumed that *all* rebel governance is a means to a violence-producing, military end. Rather than appreciating the range of rebel governance strategies and associated trade-offs, most current scholarship assumes that any governance facilitates recruitment, support and the extraction of resources.

An emphasis on the military aspects and violent behaviors of rebel groups with less transformative, non-revolutionary goals makes sense because the long-term objectives of these groups incentivize leaders to prioritize their military campaigns. But for rebel groups with more transformative, revolutionary goals—including some of the most consequential organizations like the Chinese Com-

unist Party, the Viet Minh, Hezbollah and some al-Qaeda affiliates—the political, governance achievements are of equal importance. *Governing for Revolution* brings to the fore the importance of political aspects of civil wars, and shows that for some rebel groups, violence is but a means to a political, governance end. To paraphrase Mao, power may come from the barrel of a gun but it is the revolutionary, political organization that holds and directs this gun. Rebel groups with more transformative, revolutionary goals are willing to expend significant resources, face sustained local resistance, and even imperil themselves and civilians in pursuit of building a new state and society that comports with their transformative ambitions *during* civil war. Rebel organizations with more transformative, revolutionary goals ultimately operate in ways that are fundamentally distinct from rebel groups with less transformative, non-revolutionary goals.

The second contribution of *Governing for Revolution* is that even contemporary rebel groups with more transformative, revolutionary goals are embedded in governance processes that can be traced back centuries. Revolutionary leaders—including leaders of nation-states and empires—pursued intensive governance policies that can only be explained by their normative commitments to achieving transformative ends. Both during and outside of civil war, these same revolutionary leaders have studied, learned from, innovated upon and implemented the governance initiatives of previous revolutionary movements. For instance, the Jacobins of the French Revolution studied the political institutions borne from the American Revolution. Vladimir Lenin researched the Jacobins' economic reform and redistribution policies. Mao Tse-Tung was deeply influenced by and adapted many of the governance practices Lenin implemented after 1917, such as a mass literacy campaign. Mao's influential coupling of maximal and intensive governance with guerrilla warfare during domestic conflict precipitated other rebel groups with similar goals to adopt his dual warmaking and state-making strategy. The institutions Mao constructed during war continue to influence al-Qaeda strategists today.

Because revolutionary leaders learn from and apply to their own contexts the same intensive governance projects from the same corpus of previous revolutionary experiences, a general framework for pursuing revolution through socially transformative governance has emerged. This framework has evolved and survived among revolutionary leaders across ideological categories. Although this intensive governance framework was primarily implemented among revolutionary leaders of nation-states and empires *after* revolutionaries had captured the seat of power, the success of Mao Tse-Tung in 1949 made rebel groups a carrier of this revolutionary governance tradition *during* the contestation for state control.

In terms of policy implications, my research suggests that Islamist rebel groups learn from contemporary and historical rebel organizations, including national liberation movements of old, and may attempt to replicate an Islamist version of Mao's intensive governance model. Islamist insurgencies are thus more likely to mirror the types of rebel groups the United States encountered during the Cold War, such as the Vietnamese Viet Minh. Places that experienced maximal and intensive rebel governance may also pose significant challenges to post-conflict reconstruction efforts. For instance, because rebel groups will have already endeavored to alter existing social, political and economic formations through governance, reversions to the pre-war status quo could trigger revenge killings and violence (Petersen 2002; Balcells 2017).

### 3 Book Overview and Chapter Synopses

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**Chapter 1- Introduction.** I provide an introduction and overview of the book, outlining the theoretical framework and mixed-methods approach that leverages an original dataset, fieldwork involving elite interviews in Lebanon, archival data collected across five countries and six archives and qualitative case studies.

**Chapter 2- Rebel Goals Determine Governance Strategies.** In Chapter Two, I demonstrate that governance strategies are not simply a binary choice between governing (usually as much as possible) and violence. Rather, rebel governance strategies range from more intensive to more limited. I argue that what predicts variation in rebel governance strategies is the nature of rebels' long-term goals. Long-term objectives can be more or less transformative. Rebels with more transformative, revolutionary ambitions engage in more intensive governance that entails changing the state, and sometimes also society during war. These rebel groups could save such maximal and intensive governance until after victory, but instead rebel leaders seeking great transformation pursue radical changes during war, often rendering military victory more elusive. The reason why revolutionary rebel leaders pursue this more challenging path is because of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP innovated a strategy of maximal and intensive governance during war to achieve sociopolitical transformation, propagated this model globally, and trained other rebels in how to execute this model. These efforts, in combination with more rebel organizations adopting the Chinese model, set global expectations about the correct method for rebel groups to achieve revolution: maximal and intensive governance during war. This global context altered the strategic calculus of rebel leaders with revolutionary ambitions in two ways. First, rebel leaders with these goals studied previous examples of rebel groups that achieved similar goals to emulate best practices, including governance. Through their search, rebel leaders came to believe in the necessity and the appropriateness of implementing the Chinese model of maximal and intensive governance during war to achieve their revolutionary objectives. Second, rebel leaders with more transformative, revolutionary goals believed that conformance to international expectations by executing the Chinese model would generate international legitimacy that would be rewarded materially and politically. By contrast, rebel groups with less transformative goals will be more likely to limit their governance initiatives. These rebel organizations need only military victory to succeed, and most can gain the concessions they desire with a sufficiently sustained military campaign. Although rebel leaders with less transformative ambitions are frequently fully aware of the Chinese model, they consciously and strategically avoid it in order to prioritize the military campaign over transformative change.

**Chapter 3- The Governance Portfolio of the Chinese Model.** Moving to Chapter Three, I offer an overview of the Chinese model of governance. To demonstrate that rebel groups adopted this governance model, I delineate the specific institutions of which the model is composed and the challenges this model presents. Importantly, because the Chinese model of governance refers to a portfolio of wartime governance institutions, rebels need not learn of the Chinese model through the study of the CCP directly. Rather, rebels could learn of the Chinese model from any rebel group that implemented it.

**Chapter 4- The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Varying Goals and Varying Governance.** In Chapter Four, I examine a paired case comparison of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). These two groups are highly similar, differing only in their long-term goals and governance initiatives. Though the ELF sought to create an independent Eritrea, the group's vision of an independent Eritrea was exclusionary, privileging the non-majority Muslim population and refusing any attempt to alter existing sociopolitical structures. Even when the ELF adopted communism as its official ideology, any of the ELF's espoused commitments to social and political transformation were almost wholly insincere and instrumental. By contrast, the EPLF — the leadership of which were initially part of the ELF and which operated in the same place and same time as the ELF — sought to fundamentally transform state and social relations within Eritrea, replacing the existing clan and tribal networks with a fundamentally new social and political order. Variation in the transformative nature of rebel group goals determined the strategies rebels adopted: the ELF adopted a governance strategy that relied on pre-existing institutions as well as some weak and Potemkin governance innovations, while the EPLF implemented the Chinese model of governance during war, learned directly in China before the EPLF even formed. Importantly, however, leaders of both groups were familiar with alternative models of governance and elected to pursue either more moderate or more intensive governance interventions. The extremely tight comparison between the two groups allows me to investigate the causal determinants of variation in governance strategies. Data from this chapter include primary archival sources accessed at the U.S. National Archives in Adelphi, Maryland and the U.K. National Archives in Kew, United Kingdom.

**Chapter 5- The Changing Goals of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army.** In Chapter Five, I present a within-case comparison that investigates the causes of changes in governance provided by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) over time. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the SPLM/A had less transformative objectives and decided to limit governance despite leaders knowing about the Chinese model of governance. In 1994, however, the SPLM/A changed goals and adopted more transformative aims. At the same time, it also announced an intensified effort to construct a governing and administrative system. Because the SPLM/A's goals changed over time, I am able to evaluate whether this change corresponded to a change in rebel governance strategies consistent with theoretical expectations. Furthermore, because the SPLM/A, ELF and EPLF (from Chapter Four) overlapped with each other temporally, and operated in neighboring countries, I am able to compare variation in rebel goals across all three cases, and the corresponding variation in governance among organizations with more or less transformative objectives.

**Chapter 6- East Timor: Modeling Intensive Governance.** Chapters Six and Seven evaluate the adoption of intensive governance during war among non-communist, but nevertheless revolutionary rebel groups: the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN, Chapter Six) and Hezbollah (Chapter Seven). FRETILIN was a secessionist, national liberation movement.

Though initially non-communist and recognized internationally as such, when FRETILIN controlled territory from 1974 to 1979, the group explicitly adopted Mao's strategy of extensive wartime governance, despite the fact that it hindered the group's military campaign, endangering fighters and civilians. Although FRETILIN eventually radicalized and became communist, this was only after they implemented the Chinese model of governance. Chapter Six includes data from primary archival documents collected in East Timor, Australia and the United Kingdom.

**Chapter 7- Revolutionary Islamist Adaptations of the Chinese Model: The Case of Hezbollah.** Chapter Seven examines the governance behavior of a revolutionary Islamist insurgency, Hezbollah, from its inception until 2000. The Hezbollah case not only relies on data from qualitative sources, but it also includes research from interviews and fieldwork conducted in Beirut, Lebanon in May 2015. The data demonstrate that Hezbollah closely studied two organizational and strategic forms, contemporary Islamist parties and leftist revolutionary rebel groups of the Cold War. Hezbollah determined that the organizational and strategic path best suited to achieve its profoundly transformative ambitions were the leftist rebel groups—including the CCP and rebel groups that adopted the Chinese model—that similarly aspired to and achieved profound social and political transformation. Post-revolutionary Iranian officials influenced the way Hezbollah implemented the Chinese model, such that institutions were more consistent with Islamist ideology. The dual influences of previously successful revolutionary leftist rebel groups and the Iranian revolution resulted in Hezbollah's implementation of an Islamist interpretation of the Chinese model of governance. The influence of historical revolutionary rebel groups continues today as Hezbollah explicitly references Mao Tse-Tung and Ho Chi Minh as revolutionary peers, and publicly compares its leader, Sayeed Hassan Nasrallah, to Mao and Ho on its organizational and news websites.

**Chapter 8- A Statistical Analysis of Rebel Goals and Rebel Governance.** In Chapter Eight, I rely on an original dataset of rebel governance to statistically evaluate whether revolutionary rebel groups are more likely to provide more expansive governance, an observable implication of my theory. First, I test whether some underlying factor determines both the goals of a rebel group, as well as the governance of a rebel group. Then, I test whether rebels with revolutionary goals are associated with more extensive governance, compared to rebels without revolutionary goals. Finally, I test whether revolutionary rebel groups build a broader portfolio of governance institutions. The results of my statistical analysis are consistent with theoretical expectations.

**Chapter 9- Conclusion: Looking Forward by Looking Back.** Finally, I present the implications of this research for revolutions, governance, civil war processes and U.S. foreign policy in Chapter Nine. Specifically, I elaborate on how the revolutionary template pioneered by Mao has been adapted to an Islamist context through al-Qaeda strategists Abu Ubayd al-Qurashi and his protégé, Abu Bakr al-Naji. Both strategists were heavily influenced by Mao and the Chinese Civil War, and similar to Mao, advocate for the building of an Islamic state and society during war itself. These strategists, in turn, influenced jihadist movements like the Islamic State in the Syrian Civil War today. I then highlight how this cross-ideological revolutionary learning has occurred among revolutionary movements throughout history. Even outside the context of civil war, aspiring revolutionaries study the governance behaviors of previous revolutions, then adopt these learned governance initiatives to their own contexts and ideological frameworks. Thus, in the same way that revolutionary rebel groups studied and mimicked the Chinese model of governance in war, revolutionaries like Vladimir Lenin or Maximilien Robespierre studied and mimicked the governance behaviors of previously successful revolutions.

## 4 Readership

*Governing for Revolution* will appeal to both academics and policy-makers, while nicely complementing the publication list and existing readership at Cambridge University Press. In particular, the project could be included in the Comparative Politics or the Problems of International Politics series. *Governing for Revolution* might also be assigned for classes alongside several recent Cambridge University Press books to which it is closely related, but with which it does not overlap: Ana Arjona's *Rebelocracy* (2016), Reyko Huang's *Wartime Origins of Democratization* (2016), and Andreas Wimmer's *Waves of Nationalism* (2012). Because my book could be easily be assigned alongside these existing Cambridge University Press works, overall Cambridge book sales would increase.

Though written as a political science work at the nexus of International Relations and Comparative Politics, the manuscript draws heavily on theoretical approaches found in sociology and history, and so it should be of interest to an multi-disciplinary readership. The cases analyzed may also attract scholars of Africana studies and Middle East politics. Furthermore, because the text relies on a variety of methodological approaches—ranging from quantitative analyses to fieldwork or archival research—*Governing for Revolution* appeals across methodological divides.

The book will most likely find an audience within several sections of the American Political Science Association: Conflict Processes; International Security; Comparative Politics; and International History and Politics. The book project would also be well-received at the Peace Science Society (International), the Conflict Research Society, and the International Studies Association's Peace Studies Section and International Security Studies Section. Although the project heavily diverges from my dissertation, the dissertation upon which this project is based received the 2016-2018 Walter Isard Award for Best Dissertation in Peace Science. Research conducted for the book has also been awarded Honorable Mention for Best Paper presented in 2016 by APSA's Conflict Processes section.

Outside the academy, for policy practitioners, the text provides insights on how rebel leaders develop and deploy strategies of both warmaking and statebuilding. These insights have proven useful to policy makers in the United States and in the United Kingdom who have consulted with me on the book project and who deal with rebel governance on a daily basis. U.S. Special Forces have already invited me to present work from my project at an engagement at Fort Bragg. The text also has direct relevance for NGOs like Geneva Call, or think-tanks like the U.S. Institute of Peace, two research-oriented institutes that have consulted with me on my research. The theoretical rigor of the text, combined with detailed case knowledge from primary archival sources offers meso-level insights on a variety of cases that may have relevance today, in places like Yemen and Syria.

I have also structured the text to maximize readership. Chapters can be read individually or as a whole, so that the work is more likely to be assigned in a variety of classes, or recommended to professional colleagues for a clear overview of rebel governance (Introduction); a theory of the origins and causes for adopting certain rebel governance strategies (Chapter 2 or Chapter 3); case studies of rebel groups operating in Africa that test this theory (Chapters 4 and 5); case studies in South East Asia (Chapter 6) and the Middle East (Chapter 7); a statistical analysis of rebel goals and governance strategies (Chapter 8). The book concludes with an account of future trends in rebel behavior (Chapter 9).

## 5 Market and Marketing Strategy

*Governing for Revolution* is designed as a work on civil wars, and primarily contributes to scholarship in this field. The book, however, engages with a broader multi-disciplinary audience working across several different areas of inquiry. In this section, I describe these scholarly areas and explain the types of classes in which the book may be assigned. Specifically, the text intervenes into ongoing debates on civil war by highlighting the strategic logic undergirding rebel leaders' choices to engage in certain governance behaviors. Furthermore, it situates civil war and certain types of rebel governance in two broader, historical processes: revolution and statebuilding. I organize my discussion of the market for each of these fields below. I then conclude with a marketing strategy for the text.

### Civil Wars and Rebel Governance

The most prominent books already in the field of rebel governance are Jeremy Weinstein's *Inside Rebellion* (Cambridge 2006), Zachariah Mampilly's *Rebel Rulers* (Cornell 2011); Ana Arjona's *Rebelocracy* (Cambridge 2016); Arjona, Mampilly and Nelson Kasfir's edited volume *Rebel Governance in Civil War* (Cambridge 2015), Nicholai Hart Lidow's *Violent Order* (Cambridge 2016), Reyko Huang's *The Wartime Origins of Democratization* (Cambridge 2016), Aisha Ahmad's *Jihad and Co.* (Oxford 2017). All of these texts assume that rebels aim to provide governance because governance has solely positive consequences for the rebel group, and scholars focus on factors that accelerate or attenuate governance. For instance, Weinstein (2006) identifies resource endowments stemming from lootable resources or narcotics as the critical factor that inhibits governance. Mampilly (2011) identifies pre-war state penetration, competition and conflict duration as factors that accelerate governance, while foreign support, internal discord or conflict intensity detract from rebels' governance. By contrast, Arjona (2016) argues that state penetration creates civilians more supportive of the state, and more resistant to rebel efforts to govern. Once rebels' basic survival needs are met, rebel groups will pursue governance to the greatest extent possible, unless they encounter local civilian resistance caused by state penetration. Similarly, Ahmad (2017) argues that jihadist are better able to form proto-states with the support of local civilian business leaders. Lidow (2016), like Weinstein, turns to the material incentives that rebel groups can provide to top leadership to explain rebel governance in Liberia, while Huang (2016) finds that rebels who rely on civilians economically provide more governance.

Each author identified above explores organizational, environmental, structural or local factors that inhibit or accelerate governance. All authors assume that governance is a binary choice, rather than a spectrum characterized by more or less intensive governance interventions. *Governing for Revolution* fills this gap in the literature. Furthermore, there is almost no overlap in the case studies included in *Governing for Revolution* and the case studies included in the other works (the one exception being the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army, which is also included in Mampilly 2011). As a result, pairing *Governing for Revolution* with any of these texts for a research project or a class presents a complete picture of rebel group governance, as well as the challenges rebels encounter in its implementation.

### Statebuilding and State Formation

My book is most likely to be read or assigned alongside works like *Internal Colonialism* (University of California 1975) by Michael Hechter, *States and Power in Africa* (Cambridge 2000) by Jeffrey Herbst, *The Statebuilders Dilemma* (Cornell 2016) by David Lake, *Coercion and Capital in*

*Early Modern Europe* (Blackwell 1992) by Charles Tilly, *Waves of Nationalism* (Cambridge 2012) by Andreas Wimmer, and Ariel Ahram's *Break All the Borders* (Oxford 2019). Like *Governing for Revolution*, these texts examine how leaders consolidate power and authority over people and space, the challenges leaders face in the process, and in the case of Wimmer (2012), how ideal-typical political-organizational models spread globally. Unlike *Governing for Revolution*, however, many of these texts emphasize the importance of governance to mobilize soldiers and resources for war, but cannot explain the intensive and normatively-driven statebuilding initiatives of revolutionary leaders, nor can they explain the spread of a revolutionary governance model across space and time.

One notable recent exception is Ahram (2019), who studies the origins of separatist movements and their state formation efforts in the Middle East. Ahram (2019) argues that such campaigns cannot be understood without appreciating the broader historical context in which these groups emerge, and from which these groups draw inspiration. Likewise, I argue that certain forms of rebel statebuilding must be understood within a broader, historical context of governing for revolutionary transformation.

## **Contentious Politics and Comparative Revolutions**

For projects about or courses on contentious politics and revolutionary movements, *Governing for Revolution* might be read or assigned alongside texts such as *Contentious Politics* (Oxford 2007) by Charles Tilly and Sydney Tarrow, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Addison-Wesley 1978) by Charles Tilly, *Revolution and Rebellion* (University of California 1991) by Jack Goldstone, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge 1979) by Theda Skocpol and *No Other Way Out* (Cambridge 2001) by Jeff Goodwin. These texts focus on when revolutions occur and why they are successful. *Governing for Revolution* demonstrates how revolutions during civil wars unfold, and how statebuilding can be a contentious repertoire deployed by this specific set of actors. Moreover, *Governing for Revolution* provides an update to these texts, which have largely overlooked or preceded revolutionary jihadist groups and their connections to earlier revolutionary movements.

## **Marketing Strategy**

To ensure maximum distribution of the book, upon publication, I plan to publish short articles or Op-Eds related to the book in general-interest outlets such as *Foreign Affairs*, the *Washington Post*, the *New York Times* and *Political Violence at a Glance*. I already have a successful track record of publishing in many of these outlets. American University will also provide me with funding to host a book launch in Washington, DC, where I plan to present my work and sell my book to an audience of scholars, think tank researchers and policy practitioners. American University also provides me with funds to purchase copies of my book to send to people who will be most likely to assign it for class. I will also schedule book talks at think tanks such as the Brookings Institution and RAND Corporation, where I was a pre-doctoral fellow and associate (respectively), as well as the Center for New American Security in Washington, DC. As noted above, I have already been invited by U.S. Special Forces on a speaking engagement about my book research.

## **6 Manuscript Information**

The full manuscript for this book project is ready for review and contained herein. The manuscript is approximately 100,000 words and contains about 20 figures, tables and maps in the main text, as well as 20 tables and eight figures in the Online Appendices included with the manuscript.

In October 2017, I held a book workshop attended by Zachariah Mampilly, Bridget Coggins, Miles Kahler and Keith Darden. The current manuscript reflects their suggested revisions.

## 7 About the Author

Megan A. Stewart is an Assistant Professor at the School of International Service at American University. She completed her Ph.D. with distinction from Georgetown University in 2016, and from 2016-2017, she was a Post-Doctoral Research Associate and Lab Manager at the University of Virginia's Experimental Lab working with Professor Todd S. Sechser.

Professor Stewart's research investigates how and why political actors create new social, economic and political orders during war, and the enduring consequences of these endeavors. Her work has been published in *International Organization*, *Journal of Politics*, *Conflict Management and Peace Studies* and is forthcoming in *Research and Politics*. In 2016, her paper in *International Organization*, "Civil War as State-Building," received honorable mention for the Best Paper Award by APSA Conflict Processes Section. In 2018, her dissertation, "Civil War as State Building: The Determinants of Insurgent Public Goods Provision," was awarded the Walter Isard Award for the Best Dissertation in Peace Science.

Beyond the academy, Professor Stewart has actively worked to engage a broader general audience with her research. Her work has been featured in the *Washington Post*, *Political Violence at a Glance* and the *Project on Middle East Political Science* (POMEPS). She has consulted with British government officials, U.S. Special Forces, think-tanks and NGOs on her research projects.

# Megan A. Stewart

## Curriculum Vitae

American University  
School of International Service  
4400 Massachusetts Ave NW  
Washington, DC 20016

Phone: (202) 885-6703  
Email: mastew@american.edu  
Homepage: meganastewart.org

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## Academic Positions

Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University, August 2017-Present

Post-Doctoral Research Associate, Politics Department, University of Virginia, 2016-2017

Brookings Institute Pre-Doctoral Research Fellow, 2015-2016

## Education

Ph.D., Government, Georgetown University, 2016

*Dissertation (Defended with Distinction): "The Determinants of Rebel Public Goods Provision."*

**2018 Winner for Walter Isard Best Dissertation in Peace Science (Peace Science Society)**

*Committee:* Daniel Byman (chair), Desha Girod, Daniel Nexon

M.A. in passing, Government, Georgetown University, 2012

*Fields:* International Relations, Methodology

B.A., *magna cum laude*, Politics and Journalism, New York University, 2010

## Publications

"Secessionist Social Services Reduce the Public Costs of Civilian Killings: Experimental Evidence from the United States and United Kingdom" [with D.J. Flynn]. *Forthcoming at Research and Politics*.

"Civil War as State-Making: Strategic Governance in Civil War" *International Organization* (2018).

**Honorable Mention:** Best Paper Award (2016), APSA Conflict Processes Section

"Do Good Borders Make Good Rebels? Foreign Territorial Control and Civilian Casualties". [with Yu-Ming Liou] *Journal of Politics*. (2017).

"Mass Protests and the Resource Curse: The Politics of Demobilization in Rentier Autocracies" [with Desha M. Girod and Meir R. Walters] *Conflict Management and Peace Science* (2016).

## In Review or Revision

“Urban Concentration and Civil Wars: Population Distribution and Civil War Intensity” [with Dani Nedal and Michael Weintraub]. *Revise and Resubmit*.

“Rebel Political Institutions” [with Zachariah Mampilly] *Revise and Resubmit*.

“Statebuilding, Violence and Social Order: the Legacies of the U.S. Civil War” [with Karin Kitchens] *Under review*.

“Rebel Resource Extraction and Healthcare: Strategic Incentives for Social Service Provision” [with Justin Conrad and Liana Reyes-Reardon]. *Under review*.

## Works in Progress

**Governing for Revolution.** Book Manuscript (Preparing for Submission, December 2018).

“Pro-Social Behavior, Violence and Gender: Evidence from Four Experiments” [with Todd S. Sechser]

“Colonial Rule and the Emergence of Revolutionary Rebel Groups” [with Calvin Ellison]

“Women in War: The Post-Conflict Consequences of Women’s Participation in Civil War” [with Shirley Adelstein and Alexis Henshaw]

## Policy and Media Publications

“In Search of Recruits, Neo-Nazis Turn to Islamists’ Social Service Provision.” *Political Violence at a Glance*. 30 January 2018.

“Beyond the State: Ordering as a Scalable Process.” *International Studies Quarterly* Online Symposium on: *Comparing International Systems in World History: Anarchy, Hierarchy, and Culture*. (2017).

“The Islamic State: Caliphate Interrupted, but not Defeated.” *Sustainable Security*. Oxford Research Group. 25 August 2017.

“The Legacy of Reconstruction and Occupation After the US Civil War.” *Political Violence at a Glance*. 15 August 2017.

“THE GOVERNANCE NEXUS: Surveying the Research on Violent Extremism, Governance Failures, and the Quest for Political Legitimacy.” *United States Institute of Peace*. Resolve Network. (2017)

“Trump’s plan for Syria safe zones could put civilians at even more risk.” *Washington Post’s The Monkey Cage* blog. 23 February 2017.

“The Global-Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System: Assessment and Implications for Strategic Users.” *RAND Report RR-1680-DSCA*.

“Why the Islamic State is so Bad at Being a State.” *Political Violence at a Glance*. 22 December 2015.

“What’s So New About the Islamic State’s Governance?” *Project on Middle East Political Science, POMEPS Studies* 9, October, 2014. Also featured in an October 7, 2014 post on the *Monkey Cage*.

“Case Study on Rwandan Genocide,” Political Instability Task Force Casebook on Genocide.

“Case Study on Haitian Political Violence (1991-1994),” Political Instability Task Force Casebook on Genocide.

## Grants, Scholarships, and Other Awards

Walter Isard Dissertation Award, Peace Science Society (2018)

Dean's Summer Research Award (DSRA), American University (2017)

Honorable Mention, Best Paper Award, APSA Conflict Processes Section (2016)

Dickey Center Post-Doctoral Fellowship 2016-2017 (Declined)

Graduate School Dissertation Research Travel Grant, Georgetown University, 2015 (\$5,000)

Qualtrics Behavioral Research Grant [with DJ Flynn] (\$2,520)

Edwin J. Beinecke, Jr. Scholarship in International Affairs, Harry Truman Foundation, 2015-2016 (\$2,500)

Graduate Scholarship, Georgetown University, AY 2014-2015

Summer Research Award, Georgetown University, 2014 (\$5,000)

Graduate Scholarship through IARPA Open-Source Initiative Grant, Georgetown University, AY 2013-2014

Finalist, Primary Investigator for Minerva Research Grant, FY 2013 (\$227,903)

Elected Chair, Georgetown Quantitative Methods Working Group, Spring 2013

Elected Vice Chair, Georgetown Quantitative Methods Working Group, Fall 2012

Graduate Scholarship through IARPA Open-Source Initiative Grant, Georgetown University, AY 2012-2013

Summer Methods Training Grant (\$3,000), Georgetown University, Spring 2012

Elected At-Large Board Member, Georgetown Quantitative Methods Working Group, Spring 2012

Graduate Scholarship, Georgetown University, AY 2011-2012

Elected Treasurer, Graduate Political Science Association, Georgetown University, Spring 2011

Phi Beta Kappa, Spring 2010

John Peter Zenger Excellence in Writing Award, New York University, Spring 2010

June Schlesinger Katz International Research Scholar Award (\$1,750), New York University, Winter 2010

Presidential Honors Scholar, New York University, 2007-2010

## Invited Presentations

UC Santa Barbara, May 2019 (*Scheduled*).

Presentation: "Governing for Revolution"

Upsalla University, May 2018.

Presentation: "Governing for Revolution"

Online Peace Science Consortium, October 2017.

Presentation: "The Historical Legacies of U.S. Post-Civil War Reconstruction: Racial Violence and Governing Institutions"

SUNY Binghamton, September 2017.

Presentation: "Governing for Revolution"

Political Violence Workshop, American University, September 2017.

Presentation: "The Historical Legacies of U.S. Post-Civil War Reconstruction: Racial Violence and Governing Institutions"

DC-Area International Relations Workshop, Georgetown University, May 2017.

Presentation: "The Historical Legacies of U.S. Post-Civil War Reconstruction: Racial Violence and Governing Institutions"

Race, Ethnicity, and Gender Working Group, University of Virginia, April 2017.

Presentation: "Women in War: The Post-Conflict Consequences of Women's Participation in Civil War"

Quantitative Collaborative, University of Virginia, April 2017.

Presentation: "Pro-Social Behavior, Violence and Gender: Evidence from Four Experiments"

GUITARS, Georgetown University, November 2016.

Presentation: "Governing for Revolution"

Emerging Scholars in Grand Strategy Conference, Notre Dame, June 2016.

Presentation: "Governing for Revolution"

Workshop on Conceptualizing Women Combatants, American University, May 2016.

Paper Presentation: "Civil War, Women and Post-Conflict Development"

Yale University Order, Conflict and Violence Workshop, February 2016.

Paper Presentation: "Civil War as State Building"

Geneva Call and Protect Education in Insecurity and Armed Conflict, "Education and Armed Non-State Actors: Towards a Comprehensive Agenda" Workshop, June 2015

American University Political Violence Research Workshop, March 2015

Paper Presentation: "Civil War as State Building: The Causes of Rebel Public Goods Provision"

Georgetown University Quantitative Methods Workshop, October 2014

"Introduction to R."

CRITICS, Georgetown University, April 2014

Paper Presentation with Desha Girod: "Repression and Backlash: Evidence from a Global Data Set."

Georgetown University Quantitative Methods Workshop, October 2013

"Introduction to R."

Georgetown University Quantitative Methods Workshop, December 2012

"Non-Parametric Models, The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test."

## Conference Presentations

International Studies Association, March 2019

Paper Presentation: "Statebuilding, Violence and Social Order: the Legacies of the U.S. Civil War" [with Karin Kitchens]

Conflict Research Society, September 2018

Paper Presentation: "The Historical Legacies of U.S. Post-Civil War Reconstruction: Racial Violence and Governing Institutions" [with Karin Kitchens]

ISSS-ISAC Annual Conference, October 2017

Paper Presentation: "The Historical Legacies of U.S. Post-Civil War Reconstruction: Racial Violence and Governing Institutions" [with Karin Kitchens]

American Political Science Association Annual Conference, August-September 2017

Paper Presentation: "The Historical Legacies of U.S. Post-Civil War Reconstruction: Racial Violence and Governing Institutions" [with Karin Kitchens]

International Studies Association Annual Meeting, February 2017

Paper Presentation: "International Legitimacy and Secessionism: Evidence from a Survey Experiment." [with D.J. Flynn]

Peace Science Society Conference, October 2016

Paper Presentation: "How Do Rebel Groups Gain Support? Evidence from Survey Experiments in the U.S. and India."

American Political Science Association Annual Conference, September 2016

Paper Presentation: "How Do Rebel Groups Gain Support? Evidence from Survey Experiments in the U.S. and India."

International Studies Association Annual Meeting, March 2016

Paper Presentation: "Women Insurgents: Neither Victims Nor Combatants."

Chair: Panel on Rebel Diplomacy.

American Political Science Association Annual Conference, September 2015

Paper Presentation: "Civil War as State Building: The Causes of Rebel Public Goods Provision."

New York University Alexander Hamilton Center Graduate Student Conference, May 2015

Paper Presentation: "Do Good Borders Make Good Rebels? Foreign Territorial Control and Civilian Casualties."

Junior Scholars Symposium. International Studies Association Annual Meeting, February 2015

Paper Presentation: "Civil War as State Building: The Causes of Rebel Public Goods Provision."

American Political Science Association Annual Conference, August 2014

Paper Presentation with Desha Girod: "Repression and Backlash: Evidence from a Global Data Set."

Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, April 2014

Paper Presentation with Desha Girod: "The Causes of Protest Backlash."

Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, April 2013

Paper Presentation: "Good Neighbor Rebels? Foreign Territorial Control and Civilian Casualties: Results from a Natural Experiment."

International Studies Association Annual Meeting, April 2013

Paper Presentation: "Estimating the Effects of the Withdrawal of State Sponsorship of Rebel Groups: Results from a Quasi-Natural Experiment."

## Teaching

“International Affairs Statistics and Methods,” Masters-level course at American University.

“Strategies of Rebellion: From Mao to ISIS,” Undergraduate research capstone, American University.

“Introduction to International Relations,” Undergraduate Introductory Course, Georgetown University, Summer 2013 and 2014.

## Service

### *Professional*

Section Chair: Foreign Policy Processes Section, APSA

Reviewer: *World Politics*, *American Journal of Political Science*, *International Organization*, *Journal of Politics*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Journal of Peace Research*, *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, *International Studies Review*, *International Interactions*

### *Departmental*

American University: Complex Governance Speaker Series Chair, Olson Scholar Mentor

Georgetown: Chair of Complex Governance Research Cluster, Women’s Caucus At-Large Member, Chair of Georgetown Quantitative Methods Working Group, Vice Chair of Georgetown Quantitative Methods Working Group, Vice President of the Graduate Political Science Association, Treasurer of the Graduate Political Science Association

## Professional Memberships

American Political Science Association, International Studies Association, Peace Science Society, Women in Conflict Studies

## Research and Technology Skills

*Languages:* Media-level Arabic, proficient in Spanish and French, basic knowledge of Czech.

*Research Skills:* Archival data, lab and survey experiments, statistical analysis, field research experience in Egypt and Lebanon.

*Technology Skills:* R, Stata and L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X