APPENDIX TABLES

Table A.1: Summary Statistics

	Mean	Median	Min	Max	S.D.	Count
Demobilization	0.22	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.41	558
Oil Rents	2.91	2.79	0.00	8.54	2.62	429
Authoritarianism	-0.70	2.00	-7.00	6.00	4.82	533
Concessions	1.13	0.00	0.00	4.00	1.48	658
Primarily Non-Violent	0.52	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.50	662
Domestic Media Salience	1.50	2.00	0.00	2.00	0.76	597
Income	8.08	8.08	5.49	10.43	1.11	551
Income Growth	0.02	0.02	-0.36	0.21	0.06	551
Population Density	4.27	4.53	0.30	6.90	1.17	548
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.25	653

Table A.2: Including Civil Wars

	(1) Demobilization
Oil Rents × Authoritarianism	0.04***
	(0.01)
Oil Rents	0.16***
	(0.05)
Authoritarianism	-0.05*
	(0.03)
Repression	-1.52***
	(0.19)
Concessions	0.00
	(0.10)
Primarily Non-Violent	-1.20***
	(0.33)
Media Salience	-0.01
	(0.01)
Income	-0.00
	(0.13)
Income Growth	3.06**
	(1.74)
Population Density	0.36***
	(0.09)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.48
	(0.50)
Constant	1.46
	(1.45)
Observations	606
Pseudo R^2	0.186

The dependent variable is demobilization of protests following government repression. The independent variables are lagged by one year. Positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood of demobilization. Standard errors in parentheses; $*$ sig at 10%; $**$ sig at 5%; $***$ sig at 1% (one-tailed). The significant positive coefficient for *Oil Rents* × *Authoritarianism* in Model 1 supports the hypothesis.

Table A.3: Demobilization in Oil Rich vs. Oil Poor Countries

	(1) Demobilization	(2) Demobilization
Authoritarianism	0.15***	-0.05*
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	-0.98***	-1.68***
	(0.15)	(0.22)
Observations	281	189
Pseudo R^2	0.065	0.010

The dependent variable is demobilization of protests following government repression. Model 1 contains a sample of protest campaigns in oil rich countries, defined as countries with higher than the sample average oil rents per capita. Model 2 contains a sample of protest campaigns operating in oil poor countries, defined as countries with lower than the sample average oil rents per capita. We use a logistic regression model. Positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood of demobilization in response to government repression. Standard errors in parentheses; $*$ sig at 10%; $**$ sig at 5%; $***$ sig at 1% (one-tailed). The significant positive coefficient for *Authoritarianism* in Model 1 but not Model 2 supports the hypothesis.

Table A.4: Omitting Outliers

	(1) Demobilization
Oil Rents × Authoritarianism	0.01***
	(0.00)
Oil Rents	0.05***
	(0.01)
Authoritarianism	0.00
	(0.01)
Repression Intensity	-0.00
	(0.05)
Concessions	0.01
	(0.02)
Primarily Non-Violent	-0.26***
	(0.05)
Domestic Media Salience	0.00
	(0.03)
Income	0.02
	(0.03)
Income Growth	0.17
	(0.40)
Population Density	0.09***
	(0.02)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.40***
	(0.10)
Constant	-0.63**
	(0.31)
Observations	306
R^2	0.346

The dependent variable is demobilization of protests following government repression. The independent variables are lagged by one year. We use a logistic regression model. Positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood of demobilization. Standard errors in parentheses; $*$ sig at 10%; $**$ sig at 5%; $***$ sig at 1% (one-tailed). The significant positive coefficient for *Oil Rents* × *Authoritarianism* in Model 1 supports the hypothesis.

Table A.5: Jackknifing

	(1) Demobilization
Oil Rents × Authoritarianism	0.06***
	(0.01)
Oil Rents	0.22**
	(0.10)
Authoritarianism	0.02
	(0.06)
Repression Intensity	0.68
	(0.60)
Concessions	-0.11
	(0.18)
Primarily Non-Violent	-0.91**
	(0.48)
Domestic Media Salience	0.01
	(0.24)
Income	0.06
	(0.24)
Income Growth	0.08
	(3.82)
Population Density	0.68***
	(0.20)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.65
	(0.89)
Constant	-7.60**
	(3.35)
Observations	323
Pseudo R^2	0.201

The dependent variable is demobilization of protests following government repression. The independent variables are lagged by one year. We use a logistic regression model. Positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood of demobilization. Standard errors in parentheses; $*$ sig at 10%; $**$ sig at 5%; $***$ sig at 1% (one-tailed). The significant positive coefficient for *Oil Rents* × *Authoritarianism* in Model 1 supports the hypothesis.

Table A.6: Including Fixed Effects

	(1) Demobilization	(2) Demobilization	(3) Demobilization	(4) Demobilization
Oil Rents × Authoritarianism	0.06***	0.04**	0.04**	0.12**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Oil Rents	0.21***	0.29***	0.30***	0.87***
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.34)
Authoritarianism	0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.26)
Repression Intensity	0.69	0.59	0.43	0.33
	(0.58)	(0.68)	(0.69)	(1.02)
Concessions	-0.11	-0.04	-0.05	0.37*
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.23)
Primarily Non-Violent	-0.94***	-0.81**	-0.83**	-1.81***
	(0.40)	(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.75)
Domestic Media Salience	-0.04	-0.35*	-0.35*	-0.02
	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.41)
Income	0.05	0.30*	0.30*	1.53
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(1.47)
Income Growth	0.36	-0.07	0.28	6.12*
	(3.48)	(3.66)	(3.71)	(4.71)
Population Density	0.65***	0.67**	0.66**	-0.22
	(0.21)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(2.56)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.57	-0.61	-0.65	
	(0.85)	(0.90)	(0.92)	
Constant	-7.16***	-10.91***	-10.88***	
	(2.93)	(3.51)	(3.67)	
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes	No
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No
Country Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	323	323	323	194
Pseudo R^2	0.203	0.249	0.251	0.174

The dependent variable is demobilization of protests following government repression. The independent variables are lagged by one year. We use a logistic regression model. Positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood of demobilization. Standard errors in parentheses; $*$ sig at 10%; $**$ sig at 5%; $***$ sig at 1% (one-tailed). The significant positive coefficient for *Oil Rents* × *Authoritarianism* in Models 1-4 supports the hypothesis.

Table A.7: Adding Controls

	(1) Demobilization	(2) Demobilization	(3) Demobilization
Oil Rents × Authoritarianism	0.06***	0.07***	0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Oil Rents	0.23***	0.24***	0.28***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Authoritarianism	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Repression Intensity	0.64	0.44	0.71
	(0.57)	(0.56)	(0.64)
Concessions	-0.12	-0.12	-0.17
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Primarily Non-Violent	-0.96***	-1.31***	-0.70**
	(0.40)	(0.44)	(0.42)
Domestic Media Salience	0.07	0.03	-0.06
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.23)
Income	0.18	-1.01**	0.17
	(0.24)	(0.45)	(0.20)
Income Growth	0.29	-0.66	1.28
	(3.42)	(3.45)	(3.54)
Population Density	0.71***	0.88***	0.63***
	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.23)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.39	0.52	0.10
	(0.89)	(0.83)	(0.91)
Infant Mortality Rate	0.01		
	(0.01)		
Urban Population (%)		0.05***	
		(0.02)	
Campaign Size			0.18
			(0.19)
Constant	-8.84***	-1.19	-8.26***
	(3.22)	(3.64)	(3.09)
Observations	321	323	260
Pseudo R^2	0.201	0.222	0.185

The dependent variable is demobilization of protests following government repression. The independent variables are lagged by one year. Positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood of demobilization. Standard errors in parentheses; $*$ sig at 10%; $**$ sig at 5%; $***$ sig at 1% (one-tailed). The significant positive coefficient for *Oil Rents* × *Authoritarianism* in Models 1 and 2 supports the hypothesis.

Table A.8: Linear Probability Model

	(1) Demobilization
Oil Rents × Authoritarianism	0.01***
	(0.00)
Oil Rents	0.04***
	(0.01)
Authoritarianism	0.01
	(0.01)
Repression Intensity	0.02
	(0.05)
Concessions	-0.01
	(0.02)
Primarily Non-Violent	-0.15***
	(0.05)
Domestic Media Salience	-0.02
	(0.03)
Income	0.01
	(0.03)
Income Growth	0.09
	(0.44)
Population Density	0.09***
	(0.02)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.23**
	(0.12)
Constant	-0.44*
	(0.34)
Observations	323
R^2	0.207

The dependent variable is demobilization of protests following government repression. The independent variables are lagged by one year. We use a linear probability model. Positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood of demobilization. Standard errors in parentheses; $*$ sig at 10%; $**$ sig at 5%; $***$ sig at 1% (one-tailed). The significant positive coefficient for *Oil Rents* × *Authoritarianism* in Models 1 supports the hypothesis.

Table A.9: Substituting Resource Rents

	(1) Demobilization
Resource Rents × Authoritarianism	0.09***
	(0.02)
Resource Rents	0.19*
	(0.13)
Authoritarianism	-0.14*
	(0.09)
Repression Intensity	0.22
	(0.45)
Concessions	-0.26**
	(0.14)
Primarily Non-Violent	-0.57*
	(0.35)
Domestic Media Salience	-0.24
	(0.19)
Income	0.06
	(0.18)
Income Growth	-2.79
	(3.09)
Population Density	0.59***
	(0.21)
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.22*
	(0.75)
Constant	-5.77**
	(2.70)
Observations	338
Pseudo R^2	0.182

The dependent variable is demobilization of protests following government repression. The independent variables are lagged by one year. Positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood of demobilization. Standard errors in parentheses; $*$ sig at 10%; $**$ sig at 5%; $***$ sig at 1% (one-tailed). The significant positive coefficient for *Resource Rents* × *Authoritarianism* in Model 1 supports the hypothesis.

Table A.10: Evaluating Mechanisms: Omitting Outliers

	(1) Repression Intensity	(2) Foreign Support
Oil Rents × Authoritarianism	0.00**	0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Oil Rents	-0.01	-0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Authoritarianism	-0.02**	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	2.82***	0.59***
	(0.05)	(0.04)
Observations	369	315
R^2	0.020	0.036

The dependent variable in Model 1 is intensity of government repression of protests. We use an ordered logistic regression model. Positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood that a government uses higher intensity repression during a protest campaign. The dependent variable in Model 2 is whether a government receives foreign support during a campaign. We use a logistic regression model. Positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood that a government receives foreign support during a protest campaign. The independent variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors in parentheses; $*$ sig at 10%; $**$ sig at 5%; $***$ sig at 1% (one-tailed). The significant positive coefficient for *Oil Rents* × *Authoritarianism* in Models 1 and 2 supports the hypothesis.

Table A.11: Evaluating Mechanisms: Jackknifing

	(1) Repression Intensity	(2) Foreign Support
Oil Rents × Authoritarianism	0.05***	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Oil Rents	-0.08*	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Authoritarianism	-0.14***	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Constant		0.34**
		(0.18)
cut1		
Constant	-2.52***	
	(0.22)	
cut2		
Constant	-2.21***	
	(0.21)	
cut3		
Constant	-1.54***	
	(0.20)	
Observations	406	319
Pseudo R^2	0.049	0.014

The dependent variable in Model 1 is intensity of government repression of protests. We use an ordered logistic regression model. Positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood that the government uses higher intensity repression during a protest campaign. The dependent variable in Model 2 is whether a government receives foreign support during a campaign. We use a logistic regression model. Positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood that the government receives foreign support during a protest campaign. The independent variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors in parentheses; $*$ sig at 10%; $**$ sig at 5%; $***$ sig at 1% (one-tailed). The significant positive coefficient for *Oil Rents* × *Authoritarianism* in Models 1 and 2 supports the hypothesis.

Table A.12: Evaluating Mechanisms: Including Fixed Effects

	(1) Repression Intensity	(2) Repression Intensity	(3) Repression Intensity	(4) Repression Intensity
Oil Rents × Authoritarianism	0.05***	0.02**	0.02**	0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Oil Rents	-0.04	-0.00	0.06	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Authoritarianism	-0.17***	-0.11***	-0.15***	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.02)
Constant				2.66***
				(0.15)
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes	No
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No
Country Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	406	406	406	406
Pseudo R^2	0.072	0.102	0.130	
R^2				0.027
cut1				
Constant	-1.62***	-2.34**	-0.97	
	(0.33)	(1.21)	(1.29)	
cut2				
Constant	-1.30***	-2.01**	-0.63	
	(0.32)	(1.21)	(1.29)	
cut3				
Constant	-0.61**	-1.26	0.16	
	(0.32)	(1.21)	(1.29)	

The dependent variable in Models 1-4 is intensity of government repression of protests. We use an ordered logistic regression model. Positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood that the government uses higher intensity repression during a protest campaign. The independent variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors in parentheses; $*$ sig at 10%; $**$ sig at 5%; $***$ sig at 1% (one-tailed). The significant positive coefficient for *Oil Rents* × *Authoritarianism* in Models 1-4 supports the hypothesis.

Table A.13: Evaluating Mechanisms: Including Fixed Effects

	(1) Foreign Support	(2) Foreign Support	(3) Foreign Support	(4) Foreign Support
Oil Rents × Authoritarianism	0.03***	0.02*	0.02**	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Oil Rents	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.27
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.21)
Authoritarianism	-0.03	0.01	0.00	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Constant	0.73**	-0.50	0.02	
	(0.35)	(0.40)	(0.53)	
Decade Fixed Effects	Yes	No	Yes	No
Region Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	No
Country Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	319	319	319	195
Pseudo R^2	0.043	0.061	0.094	0.040

The dependent variable in Models 1-4 is whether a government receives foreign support during a campaign. We use a logistic regression model. Positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood that a government receives foreign support during a protest campaign. The independent variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors in parentheses; $*$ sig at 10%; $**$ sig at 5%; $***$ sig at 1% (one-tailed). The significant positive coefficient for *Oil Rents* × *Authoritarianism* in Models 1 through 4 supports the hypothesis.

Table A.14: Evaluating Mechanisms: Adding Controls

	(1) Repression Intensity	(2) Foreign Support	(3) Excluding West Papau
Oil Rents × Authoritarianism	0.05***	0.02	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Oil Rents	-0.14**	-0.09*	-0.24***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Authoritarianism	-0.03	0.15***	0.09**
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Concessions	-0.39***	-0.35***	-0.39***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Primarily Non-Violent	-3.02***	-0.88***	-1.05***
	(0.48)	(0.32)	(0.37)
Domestic Media Salience	-0.71***	0.25*	1.00***
	(0.28)	(0.18)	(0.24)
Income	-0.18	0.87***	0.94***
	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.20)
Income Growth	-3.50*	1.42	1.21
	(2.64)	(2.79)	(3.09)
Population Density	0.10	0.39***	0.11
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Ethnic Fractionalization	2.79***	1.91***	0.39
	(0.83)	(0.70)	(0.77)
Constant		-8.90***	-8.44***
		(2.01)	(2.13)
cut1			
Constant	-7.00***		
	(2.15)		
cut2			
Constant	-6.52***		
	(2.14)		
cut3			
Constant	-5.47***		
	(2.13)		
Observations	367	285	249
Pseudo R^2	0.300	0.180	0.245

The dependent variable in Model 1 is intensity of government repression of protests. We use an ordered logistic regression model. Positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood that the government uses higher intensity repression during a protest campaign. The dependent variable in Models 2 and 3 is whether a government receives foreign support during a campaign. We use a logistic regression model. Positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood that a government receives foreign support during a protest campaign. The independent variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors in parentheses; $*$ sig at 10%; $**$ sig at 5%; $***$ sig at 1% (one-tailed). The significant positive coefficient for *Oil Rents* × *Authoritarianism* in Models 1 and 3 supports the hypothesis.

Table A.15: Evaluating Mechanisms: Linear Probability Model

	(1) Repression Intensity	(2) Foreign Support
Oil Rents × Authoritarianism	0.02***	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Oil Rents	-0.03**	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Authoritarianism	-0.04***	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	2.63***	0.58***
	(0.07)	(0.04)
Observations	406	319
R^2	0.074	0.019

The dependent variable in Model 1 is intensity of government repression of protests. We use an ordered logistic regression model. Positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood that a government uses higher intensity repression during a protest campaign. The dependent variable in Model 2 is whether a government receives foreign support during a campaign. We use a logistic regression model. Positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood that a government receives foreign support during a protest campaign. The independent variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors in parentheses; $*$ sig at 10%; $**$ sig at 5%; $***$ sig at 1% (one-tailed). The significant positive coefficient for *Oil Rents* × *Authoritarianism* in Models 1 and 2 supports the hypothesis.

Table A.16: Evaluating Mechanisms: Substituting Resource Rents

	(1) Repression Intensity	(2) Foreign Support
Resource Rents × Authoritarianism	0.04***	0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.02)
Resource Rents	-0.13**	-0.08
	(0.07)	(0.08)
Authoritarianism	-0.20***	-0.29***
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Constant		0.43*
		(0.32)
cut1		
Constant	-2.69***	
	(0.34)	
cut2		
Constant	-2.40***	
	(0.33)	
cut3		
Constant	-1.71***	
	(0.32)	
Observations	438	349
Pseudo R^2	0.027	0.075

The dependent variable in Model 1 is intensity of government repression of protests. We use an ordered logistic regression model. Positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood that a government uses higher intensity repression during a protest campaign. The dependent variable in Model 2 is whether a government receives foreign support during a campaign. We use a logistic regression model. Positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood that a government receives foreign support during a protest campaign. The independent variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors in parentheses; $*$ sig at 10%; $**$ sig at 5%; $***$ sig at 1% (one-tailed). The significant positive coefficient for *Resource Rents* × *Authoritarianism* in Models 1 and 2 supports the hypothesis.